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Consenting Under Stress
Hila Keren*
This Article highlights a disturbing gap between what is currently known about stress
across a range of disciplines and the way stress is treated at law. It does so by focusing on
parties who seek relief from contractual obligations on the grounds that they consented
under stress. The Article first exposes the leading legal view that stress is merely a
subjective feeling and therefore merits no legal recognition. It then provides a pragmatic
synthesis of the rich study of stress in order to counter that misguided legal presumption
and to offer a better understanding of the physical, social, and psychological dimensions
of stress.
Exploring both the scientifically accepted causes of stress (stressors) and the known
outcomes that result from stress, this Article offers a new framing of stress and a set of
analytic tools that allow better legal access to the problem. This Article argues that legal
actors can and should use the non-legal scientific understanding of stress to evaluate the
arguments of those who claim to have consented to an unwanted contract while under
stress. This Article concludes that informed evaluation of stress arguments is not only
pragmatically necessary, but also conceptually required for any legal system that, like
contract law, relies on the power of choice and consent.

* Associate Professor of Law, Southwestern Law School. This Article was selected for
presentation at a working conference as part of The Vulnerability and the Human Condition Initiative
at Emory Law; I thank Martha Fineman for the opportunity to participate and receive the helpful
comments of a unique international group of scholars. The Article also benefited greatly from a
workshop at U.C. Irvine School of Law and was selected for presentation at the Spring Contracts
Conference. I thank those who read various drafts and provided important comments and suggestions,
especially Kathryn Abrams, Melvin Eisenberg, Danielle Hart, Peter Huang, Alexandra D’Italia,
Gowri Ramachandran, and Eyal Zamir. For their excellent research assistance, I thank Andrea
Brizuela, Rebecca Simon, and Liza Zakour. Special thanks go to Dane Barca, Stephanie Alessi, and
the team of editors at the Hastings Law Journal for their exceptional work.
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Introduction: The Problem of Consenting Under Stress
Have you ever experienced severe stress: stress that made it difficult
to think straight and even more difficult to sleep? Stress that made you
feel overwhelmed and perhaps depressed? If so, you understand the
problem raised by this Article. Many of us have felt the impact of this
1
kind of stress, especially in the wake of the recent economic crisis. But
even if you have not yet experienced severe stress, you probably know
what scientists have been arguing for years: Stress kills. Stress causes
severe disease, depression, loss of memory, and rapid aging of the brain.
2
It also impairs processes of decisionmaking. In many disciplines outside
the law, researchers are focusing intensely on stress and its impact. They
are investigating stress to better understand this human problem and also
to identify interventions that could help mitigate it. In legal thought,
however, the problem of stress is rarely noticed and even more rarely
understood.
One important legal context which demands awareness of stress and
its impact is the broad sphere of contracts. Parties operating under stress
often consent to detrimental, sometimes disastrous, agreements; they then
ask courts to relieve them from the legal consequences, citing their
distraught condition at the time of assent. To support their claims, they
argue that a distressed state of mind produced a defective, even
meaningless, “decision” to agree. Significantly, their argument invokes
compulsion: a claim that stress left them no choice but to consent to an
agreement that under normal conditions would have been unacceptable.
This Article refers to this claim as “the stress argument.”
Although contract law does not inherently prevent courts from
attending to the problem of contractual consent produced by stress, most
courts fail to do so. Many courts tend to dismiss the stress argument
because they fail to understand how significantly stress can distort the
decisionmaking process. Because those who consented to a contract under
stress often argue that they had no choice but to agree, the stress argument
is frequently discussed by litigants and courts under the doctrine of duress.
However, while duress is certainly the leading defense discussed by courts,
this framework is hardly exclusive. The stress argument is often analyzed

1. Am. Psychological Ass’n, Stress in America 5 (2010) (“As the U.S. economy continues to
struggle for the third year, findings from the 2010 Stress in America survey paint a picture of an
overstressed nation.”).
2. For fuller description, see the discussion of outcomes of stress, infra Part II.
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under doctrines such as unconscionability or undue influence. Regardless
of the doctrinal classification, the question is straightforward: Are there
cases in which stress justifies legal relief?
This Article answers this question affirmatively. It seeks to expose a
critical lack of legal understanding of the phenomenon of stress and to
make the normative argument that stress must be taken into account. To
do so, the Article focuses on three contexts in which the stress argument is
repeatedly used: (1) commercial loan agreements based on financial need,
(2) prenuptial agreements and separation settlements, and (3) resignation
agreements that release employers from liability. The argument that
follows does not advocate automatic relief in every case in which a party
has consented under stress. Humans suffer from many forms of stress,
which differ in their intensity and in their potential to impair choice.
Correctly understood, this Article calls for more legal awareness of the
problem of stress and its potential to undermine contractual consent.
Part I analyzes the legal disregard of stress in the contractual arena. It
reveals a troubling theme: Courts tend to favor a narrow interpretation of
the duress doctrine that fails to account for distressed voices. Within this
narrow framework, courts too often dismiss stress arguments after
classifying stress—without any reasoning or support—as nothing but a
subjective feeling. As this Part demonstrates, this emotional taxonomy
plays a major role in denying the stress a legal response. However, this
Part also exposes a less prevalent judicial approach that responds to the
problem of stress and is willing to offer relief to distressed parties. That
such a “stress-sensitive” approach exists is promising, yet these cases offer
no analysis to counter the prevailing approach that disregards stress. The
result is a confusing and inconsistent treatment of the problem of consent
produced under severe stress. What is missing is an account of the problem
of stress and how and to what extent it impairs consent.
In response to this need, Part II turns to non-legal disciplines. It
synthesizes data regarding stress gathered from biology, sociology,
neurosciences, and psychology. In all these fields, scholars have engaged in
a sustained inquiry into what turns out to be one of the greatest threats to
human health and wellness. The knowledge that has been accumulated—
which illuminates the meaning, sources, symptoms, and outcomes of
stress—has much to offer to legal actors. This synthesis also suggests how
those informative tools might be used to evaluate stress arguments in
contracts cases. In short, this Part aims to highlight the magnitude of the
problem, to counter the conventional legal argument that reduces stress
to a subjective feeling, and to share possible standards that might be
applied to the legal analysis of stress.
Part III integrates the knowledge explored in Part II into the legal
analysis of distressed consent. As a starting point, it suggests a new
perspective that focuses more on the stressed party and the quality of her
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consent and less on the behavior of the non-stressed party. This Part
argues further that the doctrinal demand that a distressed party
demonstrate lack of reasonable alternatives to consent must be revised to
reflect the impact of stress on a decisionmaker’s ability to recognize and
assess available alternatives. Finally, this Part proposes a four-element
framework for articulating and evaluating stress arguments, offering
courts and litigants the analytic tools to address the problem of consent
under stress in a disciplined fashion.
In conclusion, the Article does not advocate releasing all parties
under stress from the consequences of their consent. Such a move would
be too damaging to people’s trust in a much-needed system of contract. It
does suggest, however, that courts recognize the meaning of stress, give
careful attention to stress arguments, and award relief if the ability to
consent was substantially distorted by severe and proven stress. Without
this change, the predominant judicial approach will continue to permit
and even reward exploitation of distress.
This Article offers two contributions—one practical and one
theoretical. For practitioners, it explicates the current legal treatment of
the problem of consenting under stress and proposes new ways to
articulate stress arguments so they are less likely to be dismissed without
consideration. For judges, it proposes novel tools to assess the credibility
and weight of such stress arguments. For theorists interested in contract
law and in legal issues of consent more generally, the Article offers a
fresh set of lenses through which the ideas of consent and fault—as well
as the intersection of these ideas—can be reexamined.

I. The Inconsistent Analysis of Stress Arguments
A. The Dominant Approach: No Relief
Most courts do not view stress that leads a person to accept an
injurious contract as a sufficient reason for relief from that contract.
Parties arguing that their consent resulted from stress rather than free
choice face two obstacles that arise from the duress doctrine. The leading
obstacle is the doctrine’s fault requirement, which conditions relief on the
wrongful behavior of the other party. This requirement results in a
rejection of all arguments based on extrinsic stress that was not caused by
the other party. The other obstacle is that relief is awarded only if the
complaining party had no reasonable alternative to assent to the contract.
Courts often point to alternatives that are unlikely to be available to the
distressed parties, and they disregard the limitations that arise from their
condition.
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1. The Fault Requirement
Time and time again, courts have emphasized that to successfully use
the defense of duress, the party seeking invalidation of a contract must
convince the court that her dire straits were caused by the other party.
Consequently, most courts focus not on the stressed party but rather on
the other party. They insist that culpability, fault, wrongfulness, and
coercion, in high doses, are necessary for the invalidation of a contract.
Such a fault-based approach leads to a systematic refusal to help those
severely disrupted and worn down by stress. Pressure and desperation not
produced by the other party’s wrongful behavior have been dismissed as
irrelevant and as inadequate to meet the legal tests of duress. This
approach prevails even if the party demanding enforcement knew about
the vulnerability of the distressed party and benefited from it.
To grasp how the fault requirement leads to the dismissal of stress3
based arguments, consider a recent Sixth Circuit decision. Mary Ann
Gascho worked for more than thirty years as a nurse at a hospital until
4
she lost her job. At the time she lost her job, she signed a separation
5
agreement in which she waived all her claims against her employer. She
later sued the hospital claiming sexual harassment under Title VII; she
argued that despite the release, her allegations should be entertained
6
because her consent was a product of duress. For many years, Mary Ann
was married to the president and CEO of the hospital, Dwight Gascho,
7
with whom she had three children. After many years of marriage, Mary
Ann became aware that her husband was having an affair with the vice
8
president of the hospital. During that time, her husband abused her; one
9
night, he raped her, leaving her with a split lip. Later, when Mary Ann
confronted her husband’s mistress at the hospital, things became publically
violent. Mr. Gascho, who admitted his infidelity, “grabbed her around the
shoulders and dragged her into his office, causing bruises on her back and
10
scratches on her back, arms and wrists.” Next, in his capacity as the
11
hospital’s CEO, he fired her. At that point, the hospital’s Human
Resources Director converted the discharge to a three-day suspension
12
followed by a “mental health leave.” While on leave, the hospital’s
officials visited Mary Ann and presented her with the separation
3. Gascho v. Scheurer Hosp., 400 F. App’x 978, 979–84 (6th Cir. 2010).
4. Id. at 981.
5. Id. at 980.
6. Id. at 981.
7. Gascho v. Scheurer Hosp., No. 08-10955-BC, 2009 WL 2222872, at *3 (E.D. Mich. July 23, 2009).
8. Id. at *1.
9. Gascho, 400 F. App’x at 979–80. In another event reported in the case, he kicked her in bed,
blaming her for “snoring like a cow.” Id. at 979.
10. Id. at 980.
11. Id.
12. Id.
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agreement, which she eventually signed. The fact that she was shaken,
intimidated, and depressed by the entire crisis and its life-changing
13
consequences was known to the hospital’s officials. However, despite
offering a detailed description of Mary Ann’s distress, the court refused
to award her relief.
The appellate court explained that its refusal to award relief,
notwithstanding the extreme conditions, was due to the hospital’s lack of
fault. Mary Ann’s distress had another cause: It was mainly the fault of
14
her husband. Accordingly, Mary Ann’s condition, regardless of its
severity, was insufficient to undermine the validity of her consent. Her
15
16
witnessed physical injuries, her abuse by her husband, her undisputed
17
“great deal of stress,” her recognized “mental anguish at her husband’s
18
19
betray[al],” her documented fear of her husband’s ongoing threats, her
20
21
noticeable loss of weight, her financial and professional anxiety, her
22
ongoing crying, and the acknowledged fact that at the time of signing she
was seeing a therapist and taking both antidepressants and prescribed
23
sleeping aids —all these facts taken together were not enough to justify
relief. Even a professional diagnosis, made only one day after the
contract’s execution that confirmed Mary Ann’s “major depression” and
24
“limited coping skills,” did not help. The fault requirement worked to
block the stress argument even when no one doubted the stress or its
severity.

13. According to the district court (but not mentioned by the appellate court), one of them
“testified that he knew that [Mary Ann] was under a great deal of stress at the time.” Gascho, 2009
WL 2222872, at *2. He also testified that she “was nervous and distraught and that [she] was crying,”
adding that she “had bruises, which he was aware that she had received from Gascho.” Id. Another
official “was also aware of [Mary Ann’s] injuries, that she was on medication, that she had lost a
significant amount of weight, and that she was afraid of Gascho, who lived in an adjacent apartment.” Id.
14. Note that in deciding so the court peculiarly ignored the evident connection between the
hospital and its chief executive, Mary Ann’s boss and husband. See Gascho, 400 F. App’x at 984 (“The
hospital played no role in the husband’s physical misconduct, and of course had no reason to know
about the incidents at home.”).
15. Gascho, 2009 WL 2222872, at *2.
16. Gascho, 400 F. App’x at 984.
17. Gascho, 2009 WL 2222872, at *2.
18. Gascho, 400 F. App’x at 980 (alteration in original) (internal quotation marks omitted).
19. According to the district court’s decision, Mary Ann’s husband threatened her many times
throughout the period preceding the agreement. He threatened, for example, that she “could not walk
through the hospital without an escort” and that he would “destroy her life.” Gascho, 2009 WL
2222872, at *2–3. The record also mentions that Mary Ann was “intimidated by Gascho and fearful of
him.” Id. at *3.
20. Id. at *2.
21. Gascho, 400 F. App’x at 980.
22. Gascho, 2009 WL 2222872, at *2.
23. Gascho, 400 F. App’x at 980.
24. Gascho, 2009 WL 2222872, at *3.
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A leading case for the proposition that the duress defense necessitates
25
fault is Judge Posner’s Selmer Co. v. Blakeslee-Midwest Co. In that case, a
contractor refused to fully compensate a subcontractor; instead, he offered
26
to settle with the subcontractor for less than the agreed-upon amount.
The subcontractor accepted and later sued for the difference, arguing that
his consent emerged from a desperate financial condition that made him
27
especially vulnerable to the contractors’ pressure. In what has since
become the most familiar phrasing of the duress doctrine, Judge Posner
emphasized that the fault of the defendant is required: “The mere stress
of business conditions will not constitute duress where the defendant was
28
not responsible for the conditions.”
But why isn’t the stress enough? In Selmer, as in Gascho, the court
acknowledged that such stress existed and influenced the assent of the
party seeking relief. Judge Posner recognized the dire financial state of
29
the subcontractor, but explained that it did not matter because the other
party, the contractor, could not “be held responsible for whatever it was
30
that made [the subcontractor] so necessitous.” What makes Selmer so
significant is not simply that it established a fault requirement; Selmer
also explained why the stress of one party does not alone justify relief.
Rationalizing the logic of the duress defense, Judge Posner wrote:
[T]he promise is unenforceable. . . . not, as so often stated, because
such a promise is involuntary. . . . The fundamental issue in a duress
case is therefore not the victim’s state of mind but whether the
statement that induced the promise is the kind of offer to deal that we
31
want to discourage, and hence that we call a “threat.”
32

In other words, to Judge Posner, and to the many courts that follow his
approach, the state of mind of the person under stress is never enough in
and of itself. A contract might be involuntary and still be enforced—
33
exactly as shown by Gascho and many other cases. This part of the
25. 704 F.2d 924 (7th Cir. 1983).
26. Id. at 926.
27. Id.
28. Id. at 928 (emphasis added) (quoting Johnson, Drake & Piper, Inc. v. United States, 531 F.2d
1037, 1042 (Ct. Cl. 1976)); see Fed. Deposit Ins. Corp. v. Linn, 671 F. Supp. 547, 560 (N.D. Ill. 1987)
(“Defendants cannot blame [plaintiffs] for the pressures caused by defendants’ own business decisions
and by general economic conditions.”).
29. Selmer, 704 F.2d at 926 (“When the job was completed, Selmer demanded payment of
$120,000. Blakeslee-Midwest offered $67,000 and refused to budge from this offer. Selmer, because it
was in desperate financial straits, accepted the offer.”). It is not clear from the case what made the
subcontractor so desperate. Id. at 929.
30. Id.
31. Id. at 926–27 (emphasis added) (citation omitted).
32. Interestingly, Judge Posner has been described as a judge that “has never written an opinion
in which he found duress available to a litigant.” See Douglas G. Baird, The Young Astronomers, 74 U.
Chi. L. Rev. 1641, 1651 (2007).
33. See, e.g., Lannan v. Reno, No. 97-3170, 1998 U.S. App. LEXIS 3292, at *4–5 (7th Cir. Feb. 26,
1998) (“While Lannan may have felt that the financial, personal, and medical stress in her life
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Selmer decision stands in the way of recognizing the problem of consent
impaired by stress.
Further, not only is fault required in this narrow definition of duress,
but a higher degree of fault is now required. In Gascho, recall the
argument that the hospital was not responsible for Mary Ann’s condition.
Now consider the fact that the hospital, as an employer of both Mary Ann
and her husband, had let its CEO and president drag an employee along
the hall, causing her visible bruises and much humiliation, without taking
any measures against its harassing senior executive. Even accepting the
problematic argument that the hospital is not responsible for the
“personal” behavior of its own president and CEO, isn’t it clear that the
hospital was at least partially responsible for the turmoil that eventually
led Mary Ann to resign and sign a release form?
The Gascho decision suggests that a stress argument may fail not
only where stress is caused solely by extrinsic circumstances but also in
“mixed” cases, where the stress results from a combination of some
faulty behavior of the unstressed party and other extrinsic events.
Indeed, as other cases further clarify, in some courts stress cannot be
34
grounds for relief unless the other party was the dominant cause of it.
Consequently, the problem of stress is marginalized: Even severe stress
of one party combined with some fault of the other is not sufficient.
2. The Reasonable Alternative Barrier
The distraught condition of the party consenting under stress is
further marginalized by an insensitive application of the reasonable

necessitated the acceptance of the defendant’s offer of settlement, there is no evidence that the
defendant exploited her, oppressed her, took undue advantage of her financial or personal problems,
or otherwise wrongfully pressured her into signing the settlement agreement.”); DCR Fund I, LLC v.
TS Family Ltd. P’ship, No. 05-6232, 2008 U.S. App. LEXIS 1574, at *9–12 (10th Cir. Jan. 24, 2008)
(noting that stress coming from the wife’s illness and financial pressure was not enough because it was
not caused by any actions of the other party).
34. See, e.g., Bank of Am. v. First Mut. Bancorp of Ill., Inc., No. 09 C 5108, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
65557, at *32–33 (N.D. Ill. July 1, 2010). Like in Gascho, the party seeking relief in this case was
arguing that its consent to demanding loan terms was a product of severe pressure and desperate
circumstances. Again, the fault requirement led to a rejection of the request for relief. Id. at *33–34.
Yet, unlike in Gascho, the court did not ignore the possible contribution of the party seeking
enforcement (Bank of America) to the poor condition of the party seeking relief (the borrowers). To
the contrary, the court explicitly acknowledged at least some degree of misbehavior on the part of the
bank, which kept lending the borrowers money, dangerously increasing their indebtedness, without
disclosing to the borrowers the crucial fact, known to the bank, that their business partners were
defrauding them in a manner that would eventually ruin them financially. Id. at *5–20. However, the
recognized misbehavior of the bank was determined to be insufficient to justify relief. Engaging in an
evaluation of the level of fault on the part of the bank and weighing it against the fault of others, the
court seems to conclude that, since the bank’s fault was not the only or at least the dominant reason
for the borrowers’ demise, their argument fails. The court relied on the Selmer case to make this point,
citing the latter case as “rejecting economic duress defense where one party may have contributed to,
but did not proximately cause, the other’s financial vulnerability.” Id. at *33.
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alternative test. According to this test, a contract cannot be invalidated if
the party seeking relief had a reasonable alternative other than agreeing
to the contract in dispute. The logic of the test is that when a reasonable
alternative exists, the decision to consent represents a meaningful choice
and therefore should be enforced. However, when distressed parties
argue that their stress had left them no choice, many courts respond
unsympathetically. They tend to point out that while the stress may have
caused a feeling of compulsion, in reality other alternatives were
available and therefore there is no justification for relief. For example,
consider how the court applied the reasonable alternative test in Gascho.
There, Mary Ann argued that given her exhaustion, intimidation,
financial anxiety, and depression, she had no choice but to consent to the
hospital’s settlement offer. In response, the court dismissed her state of
mind—even though evidence other than her testimony supported her
high level of stress—and reclassified her “no-choice” as merely her
“belief.” The court subsequently rejected that “belief” by contrasting it
35
with what seemed to the court to be viable alternatives.
Labeling the stress-based argument a “belief” or a “feeling”
immediately removes it from the realm of objectivity, a requirement under
the reasonable alternative test. The gap between stress arguments and the
objective standard is further emphasized by the many decisions that
36
describe stress not simply as a feeling, but also as a “subjective” feeling.
Moreover, in some cases, the incompatibility is further highlighted by
adopting the rhetoric of “subjective feeling” and then juxtaposing it to a
description of the test that uses the term “objective.” For example, in
Satter v. Washington State Department of Ecology the court maintained:
“When Satter states that she suffered anxiety, depression, and an

35. Gascho v. Scheurer Hosp., 400 F. App’x 978, 983 (6th Cir. 2010) (“Gascho’s belief ‘that [she]
had no choice’ in signing the agreement, in view of the economic benefits offered and the risk of
economic hardship if she declined the offer, does not by itself state a claim . . . .” (alteration in
original) (emphasis added)); see Cobb v. Potter, No. 1:05CV300, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 63118, at *20–
21 (W.D.N.C. Aug. 22, 2006) (“Plaintiff contends that she was under duress and felt as if she had no
choice but to sign the waiver . . . . [but] [p]laintiff was free to not sign the Pre-Arbitration Settlement
Agreement . . . .”).
36. See, e.g., Porter v. Chi. Bd. of Educ., 981 F. Supp. 1129, 1132 (N.D. Ill. 1997) (“Plaintiff’s
generalized expression of subjective feeling is fatally conclusory and wholly unsupported by specific
factual averments to support a claim of duress.” (emphasis added)). Reducing the argument to a
“subjective feeling” is far from being an incidental choice of words. Rather, as a recent study shows, it
is the characteristic method in which courts refuse to find duress in the reality of settlements achieved
under judicial supervision. See Nancy A. Welsh, The Thinning Vision of Self-Determination in CourtConnected Mediation: The Inevitable Price of Institutionalism?, 6 Harv. Negot. L. Rev. 1, 76 (2011);
see also Fed. Deposit Ins. Co. v. Ramsey, 612 F. Supp. 326, 328–29 (E.D. Tenn. 1985) (“Defendant’s
subjective belief that he was under pressure to purchase the stock . . . is insufficient to show [economic
duress] . . . .” (emphasis added)); Yok Hing Law v. Corral, No. A120738, 2010 WL 528478, at *10 n.2
(Cal. Ct. App. Feb. 16, 2010) (“Plaintiff . . . does not cite to any authority for the proposition that a
subjective feeling of intimidation is sufficient to void an otherwise valid settlement agreement.”
(emphasis added)).
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inability to sleep or be alone, she is speaking about things she subjectively
37
felt and experienced.” The court then added that the legal “objective
standard does not take into account the things Satter was subjectively
38
feeling or experiencing emotionally.”
The conflict between the stress argument and the chosen standard is
also reflected by the types of alternatives that courts consider as
“reasonable.” Courts frequently point to options that require substantial
agency and energy, significant amounts of money, well-developed
resilience skills, and—perhaps most important—a strong drive to fight
rather than to assent. The leading alternative that courts mention in this
context is resisting the pressure to consent through litigation. Revealingly,
they refer to the litigation alternative in dozens of cases as the need to
39
boldly “stand pat and fight.” However, such an expectation ignores the
limited capabilities of distressed people at the time of consenting. For
parties overborne by stress, initiating, funding, and managing prolonged
legal battles, often against people who were deeply involved in creating
40
their condition, seems like an impossible mission.
Applying the objective/subjective dichotomy to this context while
marking the duress test as “objective” and the stress argument as
41
“subjective” is, therefore, far from a neutral stance. It is also important to
note the cumulative character of these doctrinal obstacles: Since many
courts consider duress as requiring both fault of one party and no
reasonable alternative by the other—and since those courts also narrowly
construe those elements—these elements often work in concert to deny
any relief for those consenting under stress.
B. Some Stress-Sensitive Cases
Despite the frequent disregard of stress, some courts do take stress
arguments into account and award relief to distressed parties. In those
occasional cases a fundamental, albeit somewhat old, tenet of contract
law is coming back to take center stage: meaningful consent. This tenet

37. Satter v. Wash. State Dep’t of Ecology, No. C09-5645BHS, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 80520, at
*16 (W.D. Wash. Aug. 10, 2010) (emphasis added).
38. Id. at *17 (emphasis added).
39. See, e.g., Molsness v. City of Walla Walla, 928 P.2d 1108, 1110 (Wash. Ct. App. 1996) (“Mr.
Molsness’ resignation is not rendered involuntary simply because he submitted it to avoid termination
for cause, nor is it relevant that he subjectively believed he had no choice but to resign. Objectively, he
did have a choice . . . to ‘stand pat and fight’.” (emphasis added)). A textual search for the phrase
“stand pat and fight” has yielded at least fifty-two cases in which the phrase was used to describe a
reasonable alternative.
40. See Gascho, 400 F. App’x at 984 (suggesting that Mary Ann Gascho, in her proved difficult
condition, had several reasonable alternatives, all based on taking legal actions against her husband,
including filing criminal charges against him, suing him in tort, or obtaining a restraining order against
him).
41. Those arguments will be further developed in Part III.
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obscures the majority’s focus on fault and reasonable alternatives. While
judges are naming that traditional concern differently—from will to
choice to voluntariness—they are all showing some level of care about
the impaired state of mind created by stress.
1. Taking Stress into Account
From time to time judges refuse to ignore circumstances that are
evidently stressful. One example of judicial sensitivity to stress as
42
impairing contractual consent is Holler v. Holler. That case follows a
pattern in marital dissolution cases, in which brides-to-be were pressured
by their future husbands to consent to unfair prenuptial agreements that
deprived them of many of their marital rights. Generally, courts have
dismissed duress arguments, made years later by the wives who had to
face the results of their pressured, pre-wedding consent. They have refused
to recognize the stress suffered by brides-to-be who faced the “choice”
between signing an unfair prenuptial or a cancellation of their wedding.
Even when the “choice” was presented to the bride just a few days before
the wedding, courts repeatedly opined that cancelling the wedding was a
43
reasonable alternative to consent. In Holler, however, the court found the
stressful condition of the bride both relevant and significant.
Natalia came to the United States to marry William Holler after the
44
two of them met during his visit to the Ukraine. She knew very little
English and had no income of her own, which made her fully dependent
45
on William’s support. Before they got married, Natalia became pregnant,
46
and the visa enabling her legal stay in the States was about to expire.
Under these circumstances, she wanted and needed to marry William to
stay in the county, but he required her to sign a prenuptial agreement
47
written in English. He emphasized that “she must sign the agreement if
48
she wanted to be married prior to the expiration of her visa.” Despite her
many efforts to translate the agreement into Russian or to read it in
English, Natalia was neither able to completely understand the
49
agreement, nor could she afford to hire a lawyer who would explain it to

42. 612 S.E.2d 469 (S.C. Ct. App. 2005).
43. The majority of courts have rejected claims of duress in such situations even when the
agreement was presented by the husband-to-be in the very last minute, even when he threatened to
cancel the wedding, even if the wife was pregnant, and even if she was unemployed or an immigrant.
See, e.g., Biliouris v. Biliouris, 852 N.E.2d 687, 693 (Mass. App. Ct. 2006) (rejecting a stress argument
of a bride who signed a prenuptial agreement two days before her wedding, due to fear of cancellation
of the wedding, and while pregnant and crying).
44. Holler, 612 S.E.2d at 471.
45. Id.
46. Id.
47. Id.
48. Id. at 476.
49. Id. at 475 (finding that Natalia could not understand the agreement).
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50

her and represent her interests. Eventually, only eight days before the
expiration of her visa, Natalia signed the agreement and married William
five days later. When the couple separated years later, William argued that
under the prenuptial agreement Natalia gave up her rights to equitable
distribution of their marital property and for alimony. Natalia, on the other
hand, asked for relief. Affirming a former decision of the family court, the
court of appeal ruled for Natalia, taking into account the rare
51
accumulation of circumstances that rendered her consent meaningless.
In another case, which stands in direct opposition to the Gascho
decision, a female employee named Melinda Meyers prevailed where
52
Mary Ann Gascho failed. Male senior coworkers had sexually harassed
Meyers and, after she made efforts to resist and complain, her employer
53
convinced her to resign and sign a release agreement. At the time of
consent, she was completely distraught: Meyers “was in a ‘confused and
54
55
upset’ psychological state,” “extremely frightened and intimidated,”
56
emotional and unable to “deal with anything,” and “lost control and
57
broke down.” The court rejected her employer’s motion for summary
judgment, explaining that after taking Meyers’ “mental state” into
58
account, she could not be legally seen as “knowingly and voluntarily”
59
agreeing to the release she signed.
Cases such as Holler and Meyers differ greatly from the many cases
that disregard the problem of stress. First, they seem to focus less on the
unstressed party and more on the party who consented under pressure.
Then, using varying terminologies, they tend to emphasize the principle
that a valid contract cannot be based on professed consent not
representing a meaningful choice. For the most part, the difference
between these two judicial outlooks may be traced to two opposite views
of duress. While the conventional approach underscores that duress is not

50. Id. at 476 (“Wife had no money of her own with which to retain and consult an attorney or a
translator.”).
51. The courts’ reasoning will be discussed in the following Section. See infra Part I.B.2.
52. Meyers v. Trugreen, Inc., No. 03 C 7570, 2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 9200 (N.D. Ill. May 21, 2004).
53. The question of how much explicit pressure to resign was put on Melinda was left factually
undecided by the court. According to Melinda’s affidavit she was told that if she would not resign “she
was going to be fired and would end up with no job and no money.” Id. at *8.
54. Id. at *11.
55. Id. at *12.
56. Id.
57. Id.
58. Id. at *10.
59. Id. at *17. It is worth noting that in the employment context the contractual doctrines
discussed here are often supplemented by more protective doctrines that make it somewhat easier for
stress-sensitive courts to take stress into account. One doctrine that might be helpful for employees is
the constructive discharge doctrine, which asks: “Did working conditions become so intolerable that a
reasonable person in the employee’s position would have felt compelled to resign?” Pa. State Police v.
Suders, 542 U.S. 129, 130 (2004).
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about the state of mind of the party seeking relief, the stress-sensitive
cases portray duress first and foremost as an issue of inappropriate state of
mind. The Holler court, for example, emphasized that notion by adopting
the following definition: Duress “is a condition of mind produced by
improper external pressure or influence that practically destroys the free
agency of a party and causes him to do an act or form a contract not of
61
his own volition.”
Similarly, in Meyers, the court referred directly to stress and
characterized duress as “the taking of undue advantage of the business or
62
financial stress or extreme necessities or weaknesses of another.” Other
stress-sensitive cases have highlighted the concern for the quality of
consent of the stressed party using a variety of phrases. They concluded,
for example, that stressful conditions may “wholly incapacitate a person
63
from exercising his judgment,” may render the consent “involuntary,”
64
and may result in no “meaningful choice.” Such courts have also
concluded that more inquiry should be made into the existence of
65
“meaningful ‘consent.’” These different expressions echo the repeated
emphasis in Holler of the freedom of will as a leading tenet of both
66
contract law and the doctrine of duress.
2. The Lack of Counter-Theory
How do those stress-sensitive courts reconcile their approach with
the fault requirement that prevents the accommodation of stress in the
majority of cases? Some of them avoid the doctrine of duress altogether
and utilize alternative legal doctrines to offer people consenting under
severe stress relief. Specifically, those courts mainly use the proximate

60. Selmer Co. v. Blakeslee-Midwest Co., 704 F.2d 924, 927 (7th Cir. 1983) (“The fundamental
issue in a duress case is therefore not the victim’s state of mind . . . .”).
61. Holler v. Holler, 612 S.E.2d 469, 474 (S.C. Ct. App. 2005) (emphasis added). For an identical
definition in a commercial setting, see Willms Trucking Co. v. JW Construction Co., 442 S.E.2d 197,
202 (S.C. Ct. App. 1994).
62. Meyers v. Trugreen, Inc., No. 03 C 7570, 2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 9200, at *17 (N.D. Ill. May 21,
2004) (emphasis added) (citation omitted).
63. Odorizzi v. Bloomfield Sch. Dist., 54 Cal. Rptr. 533, 540 (Ct. App. 1966) (“It is possible that
exhaustion and emotional turmoil may wholly incapacitate a person from exercising his judgment.”).
64. See In re Davis, 169 B.R. 285, 290, 304 (Bankr. E.D.N.Y. 1994); see also In re Emery-Watson,
412 B.R. 670, 675 (Bankr. D. Del. 2009) (“The Court finds that the Debtor had an absence of
meaningful choices with regard to saving the Property from foreclosure at the time they contracted
with the Defendant for its ‘sale.’” (emphasis added)).
65. Williams v. First Gov’t Mortg. & Investors Corp., 225 F.3d 738, 749 (D.C. Cir. 2000) (doubting
the meaningfulness of consent of Mr. Williams who had only a sixth-grade education from the
segregated schools of Savannah, Georgia, and who, in order to escape foreclosure, gave his consent to
a refinancing agreement that left him with no means to get food and other necessities).
66. Holler, 612 S.E.2d at 475 (“The central question with respect to whether a contract was
executed under duress is whether, considering all the surrounding circumstances, one party to the
transaction was prevented from exercising his free will . . . . Freedom of will is essential to the validity
of an agreement.” (citation omitted)).
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doctrines of undue influence and unconscionability. At other times
69
they avoid duress by turning to other contractual doctrines or, when
70
available, to special statutes. Other stress-sensitive courts, instead of
avoiding duress, attempt to harmonize the conventional interpretation of
the doctrine with their own sensitivity to stress. The result, however, may
be more confusing than harmonious. In fact, in one case the court
described the duress doctrine as containing both the idea that stress is not
enough unless caused by the other party, and the opposite idea that great
stress or extreme weakness might be enough, even without the causal
71
element. In a similar manner, the Holler court highlighted the
significance of free will, together with the requirement of fault, as if they
72
can naturally coexist. Only that court’s actual application of the doctrine
73
reveals the stress-sensitive departure from the fault requirement.
One court has gone so far as to use the duress doctrine without
reference to any fault requirement. In In re Accredited Home Lender
Holding Co., the court used the duress doctrine to find for a stressed party
74
without alluding to any fault requirement. Similar to some of the cases
67. For an example of using undue influence to cope with a stress problem instead of using duress,
see, for example, Odorizzi, 54 Cal. Rptr. at 539 (“Undue influence, in the sense we are concerned with
here, is a shorthand legal phrase used to describe persuasion which tends to be coercive in nature,
persuasion which overcomes the will without convincing the judgment. The hallmark of such
persuasion is high pressure, a pressure which works on mental, moral, or emotional weakness to such
an extent that it approaches the boundaries of coercion.” (emphasis added) (citation omitted)). At
other times, the doctrines of duress and undue influence have been used side by side. See generally
Johnson v. Int’l Bus. Machs. Corp., 891 F. Supp. 522 (N.D. Cal. 1995) (discussing duress and undue
influence arguments and rejecting them both).
68. For using unconscionability to cope with a stress problem, see, for example, Williams,
225 F.3d 738 at 748. Mr. Williams found himself agreeing to an impossible refinancing agreement in
fear of losing his home in a foreclosure process. Since the other party (a mortgage company) did not
cause Mr. Williams’ financial problems, the conventional application of the duress doctrine probably
could not have helped him. More generally, what makes unconscionability a possible home to
distraught parties is its concern with the lack of “meaningful choice.” See Holler, 612 S.E.2d at 476
(“Unconscionability is the absence of meaningful choice on the part of one party . . . .”).
69. Other doctrines that have been used are good faith and public policy. See, e.g., Williams v.
B & K Med. Sys., Inc., 732 N.E.2d 300 (Mass. App. Ct. 2000) (good faith); Motley v. Motley,
120 S.E.2d 422 (N.C. 1961) (public policy).
70. See, e.g., Blistein v. St. John’s Coll., 860 F. Supp. 256 (D. Md. 1994) (discussing a job loss case
regarding relief from waiver since the employer did not follow the requirements of the Older Worker’s
Benefit Protection Act).
71. See Reliford v. United Parcel Serv., No. 08 CV 1266, 2008 WL 4865987, at *5 (N.D. Ill. July 8,
2008) (stating, with direct reference to Posner’s decision in Selmer, that “[w]ith respect to the party
coerced into signing an agreement, difficult financial circumstances or a weak bargaining position are
insufficient to establish duress, provided that the other party was not responsible for creating those
conditions” and then adding, “[r]ather, to claim duress, a party must be under great stress or in a state
of extreme necessity or weakness” (emphasis added) (citations omitted)).
72. See, e.g., Holler, 612 S.E.2d at 474–75.
73. In Holler the court did take into account elements of the wife’s condition that could not have
been considered as caused by her husband, such as her limited proficiency in English and her fear of
having to leave the United States due to the expiration of her visa. Id. at 471–76.
74. In re Accredited Home Lender Holding Co., 441 B.R. 443 (Bankr. D. Del. 2011).
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75

already discussed, the context was a loan agreement signed by a stressed
borrower. In this case, the borrower gave his consent to a problematic
agreement under the pressure of anticipated home foreclosure and later
76
asked for relief. In response, the lenders argued that the borrower could
not use the duress defense because he failed to meet the two main tests of
77
the doctrine: fault and reasonable alternative. In terms of fault, the
lenders maintained that according to the duress doctrine, circumstances
78
that they did not cause could not be part of the coercion analysis. In
terms of reasonable alternatives, the lenders contended that the borrower
had an alternative to consenting: “[H]e could have defended the
79
foreclosure action.” This structure of argument would have certainly
worked under the conventional interpretation of the duress doctrine.
However, the court decided to award the borrower relief under the
duress defense; it did so by focusing on the borrower’s condition. The
court noted that at the time of consenting, the borrower was facing a loss
of his home, was not represented by a lawyer, and “was under the care of
80
a physician for post traumatic stress syndrome.” Significantly, the court
81
disregarded the lenders’ no-fault arguments.
Whatever the analytic framework chosen by the few stresssensitive courts has been, no framework has never directly and
explicitly recognized stress alone as a ground for relief. These stresssensitive cases are so few in number and use such different methods in
responding to the stress argument that general rules are difficult to
synthesize and destined to be imprecise. However, in each of the stresssensitive decisions, the court intuited two underlying principles, even if
it did not emphasize them. First, stress can be a serious and
demonstrable condition that might truly impair consent and, as such,
deserves judicial attention: This differs starkly from classifying stress as
merely a subjective feeling. Second, consenting under stress justifies
relief because it stands in conflict with the contractual ideals of volition,
free agency, and meaningful choice: This assumption counters the fault
75. See generally Bank of Am. v. First Mut. Bancorp of Ill., Inc., No. 09 C 5108, 2010 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 65557 (N.D. Ill. 2010); Williams v. First Gov’t Mortg. & Investors Corp., 225 F.3d 738 (D.C.
Cir. 2000).
76. Accredited Home Lender Holding Co., 441 B.R. at 444–45.
77. Id. at 447 (“The Debtors argue that the circumstances giving rise to the Forbearance
Agreement were not coercive. They assert that they acted within their legal rights as set forth in the
Mortgage by commencing the foreclosure action. They contend that Mr. Smalls had an alternative to
signing the Forbearance Agreement: he could have defended the foreclosure action.”).
78. Id. (citing McLaughlin v. State Dep’t of Natural Res., 526 So. 2d 934, 936 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.
1988) (holding that to prove duress a party must show “(1) that one side involuntarily accepted the terms
of another, (2) that circumstances permitted no other alternative, and (3) that said circumstances were the
result of coercive acts of the opposite party” (emphasis added))).
79. Id. at 447.
80. Id.
81. Id. at 447–48.
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requirement. While the goal of this Part has been to analyze the legal
confusion with regard to the problem of consenting under stress, the goal
82
of the next two Parts is to argue the importance of those two intuitions.
Accordingly, the next Part focuses on the first intuition and on the actual
meaning of stress, suggesting scientific foundation for the serious concern
83
of stress-sensitive courts.

II. Understanding Stress
A. The Study of Stress
Stress is not merely a subjective feeling. The reason so many
disciplines are interested in researching stress is the growing awareness of
its bitter consequences to individuals and their health and well-being, to
families and their cohesion, to communities and their strength, and to
84
society at large. Works in biomedicine, psychology, neuroscience,
sociology, and education all point—through diverse methods and different
theories—to one conclusion: While some stress can be valuable or at least
tolerable, prolonged, high levels of stress produce a negative impact on
human beings’ lives. This damaging aspect of stress—to physical health, to
mental condition, to cognitive functioning, and to a combination thereof—
85
has been motivating the study of stress for several decades. Beyond
concluding that stress is damaging, however, the study of stress is
sprawling and at least one stress scholar has gone as far as to call this

82. To clarify: Smoothing out the differences between these cases and resolving doctrinal
incoherence are not among of the goals of this Article.
83. Part III will engage with the second intuition regarding the importance of quality of consent.
84. There are numerous statistics of the impact of stress in the United States. See, e.g., Henry L.
Thompson, The Stress Effect: Why Smart Leaders Make Dumb Decisions—And What to Do
About It 112 (2010) (“[I]n the United States, stress costs industry an estimated $300 billion a year. . . .
It is also linked to the six leading causes of death in the United States: heart disease, cancer, lung
ailments, accidents, cirrhosis of the liver, and suicide. . . . [M]ore than 200 million people take
medication related to controlling stress.”).
85. For a concise description of the development of the scientific study of stress, see David C.
Glass, Foreword, in The Handbook of Stress Science: Biology, Psychology, and Health xvii
(Richard J. Constrada & Andrew Baum eds., 2011). Many mention the seminal work of the Viennese
endocrinologist Hans Selye and his 1956 book The Stress of Life as marking the beginning of the
modern focus on the problem of stress as an identifiable subject. See id. at xvii; see also Am. Inst. of
Stress, General Information Brochure (2012) (“Stress has become such an ingrained part of our
vocabulary and daily existence, that it is difficult to believe that our current use of the term originated
only a little more than 50 years ago, when it was essentially ‘coined’ by Hans Selye.”). By 1975 the
issue was further acknowledged by the foundation of the Journal of Human Stress, and in 1978 the
American Institute of Stress was formally established as an educational organization designed to serve
as a clearing house for information on all stress-related topics. Id. Importantly, much of the empirical
work and some of the theoretical work was implemented and funded by the U.S. Army with special
emphasis—relevant to our focus—on decisionmaking under stress. See, e.g., Kenneth R. Hammond,
Judgments Under Stress (2000).
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86

body of work “internally incommensurable.” At the same time, efforts to
87
establish an interdisciplinary discourse of stress are flourishing, and
scholars seem to share a belief in the inability to capture the phenomenon
of stress under one leading discipline, as it is never merely psychological,
purely physical, or solely sociological.
The following synthesis of the study of stress is a pragmatic response
88
to these challenges, a “useful synthesis” especially tailored for legal actors
who wonder how legal analysis can take stress into account. As I have
shown in Part I, the main resistance to arguments based on stress comes
from the notion that stress is so personal and emotional that it cannot be
assessed, proven, analyzed, and incorporated into a legal discourse.
Therefore, my goal is to offer an analysis of stress that explains its patterns,
enabling practitioners to structure stress arguments and assisting courts to
evaluate them. In creating a general framework, I found it most helpful to
draw on the Stress Process model, which was created in the 1980s by
sociologist Leonard Pearlin, and which inspired numerous works on
89
stress. According to this model, exposure to stressors that exceed one’s
ability to cope with them creates the condition of stress, sometimes called
90
distress or a stress response. Despite working under this sociological
structure, my analysis includes other findings about stress that come from
disciplines that do not necessarily share a sociological outlook. For
example, scientists interested in the impact of stress on the cardiovascular
system may care less about the causes of stress, whereas those causes are at
the core of the sociological approach. Scientists may care more about the
exact hormones released by the stressed brain, data which in turn may be
less significant to sociologists.
The legal perspective, however, necessitates attention to both causes
and outcomes, which may be crucial to courts’ abilities to evaluate the
credibility of the stress argument and to decide what legal meaning should
be assigned to it. Therefore, the following exploration of the study of stress
is divided into two Subparts. The first is focused on stressors and suggests
information relevant to assessing plausibility of stress arguments. The

86. Hammond, supra note 85, at vii.
87. See, e.g., Handbook of Stress Science, supra note 85.
88. Kathryn A. Abrams & Hila Keren, Who’s Afraid of Law and the Emotions?, 94 Minn. L. Rev.
1997, 2048 (2010) (defining “useful synthesis”: “A ‘useful synthesis’ will sort and arrange the nonlegal
knowledge in a manner which responds to the context and legal questions at hand. This means that
some important theories or data will be purposefully omitted, while other facts and theories may be
emphasized beyond their relative weight outside of law.”).
89. The leading article, which since its publication has inspired many other works, is Leonard I.
Pearlin, The Sociological Study of Stress, 30 J. Health & Soc. Behav. 241 (1989). What is known as
Pearlin’s Stress Process has inspired much study of stress using his model and understanding. See, e.g.,
Advances in the Conceptualization of the Stress Process: Essays in Honor of Leonard I.
Pearlin (William R. Avison et al. eds., 2010) [hereinafter Advances].
90. Pearlin, supra note 89, at 254.
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second concerns the outcomes of stress, offering tools to recognize known
symptoms of stress that can further assist the plausibility evaluation. This
Subpart also explains the powerful impact of stress on behavior and
decisionmaking.
B. Common Stressors
Earthquake, financial crisis, death of a loved one, work overload,
car accident, divorce, and incapacitating illness, to name a few, are all
negative experiences that can be highly challenging to humans’ wellbeing. Most people experiencing events or situations of these kinds are
deeply affected by them, and thus those circumstances may be
91
considered as “normatively stressful.” Conditions that typically cause
stress are also known in the literature as “stressors,” that is, the stimuli
92
that cause stress. The evolution of the “stressor” terminology to connect
dissimilar human experiences has been the principal accomplishment of
the pioneering stress research and a chief facilitator of the study of stress.
Efforts to create a taxonomy of stressors followed. Scientists observed
that stressors come in many shapes and forms. Some, like an injury, are
“acute” and short-term, while others, such as unemployment, may be
93
“chronic” and persist over a long period of time. Some are shared by
many, like war, while others, such as illness or bereavement, are more
94
individually experienced. Many stressors are inescapable, like a
hurricane, for example, while others may involve some level of choice,
such as pursuing a divorce. Despite those distinct categories, the study of
stress has shown that very different stressors can cause similar negative
results to the physical, mental, and psychological well-being of
95
individuals. It is this quality of stressors that has brought some
96
researchers to declare that stressors are “objective,” emerging from
verifiable characteristics of the environment and causing similar results.
And indeed, while some stressors might affect people differently, certain
stressors, such as the death of a loved one, are so noxious that almost
every person affected experiences a similar stress. This observation,
although quite elementary in the study of stress, appears quite significant
to law. If bereavement, for example, is a stressor for nearly everyone, then
a stress argument coming from a grieving person can be presumed to be
fairly credible. Accordingly, cataloguing stressors that have a universal

91. Richard S. Lazarus & Susan Folkman, Stress, Appraisal, and Coping 14 (1984).
92. The term was coined by Selye and is used by most stress theorists. See Am. Inst. of Stress,
supra note 85.
93. Lazarus & Folkman, supra note 91, at 14.
94. See id.
95. See Naomi Breslau & Ronald C. Kessler, The Stressor Criterion in DSM-IV Posttraumatic
Stress Disorder: An Empirical Investigation, 50 Biological Psychiatry 699, 699 (2001).
96. Id.
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effect may render the prima facie stress argument plausible. The study of
stress does just this: It has produced inventories of common stressors that
originate in traumatic experiences (such as rape), life-changing events
(such as divorce), and chronic conditions (such as poverty).
1. Traumatic Stressors
Following the Vietnam War the American Psychiatric Association
officially added Posttraumatic Stress Disorder (“PTSD”) to its Diagnostic
97
Manual of Mental Disorders (“DSM”). Setting standards for diagnosing
the newly acknowledged disorder, the DSM defined the first criterion as
98
an exposure to a “traumatic stressor.” The original purpose of this
“stressor criterion” was to identify traumatic stressors that do not depend
on the victim’s individual reaction to events, but rather on a clinical
evaluation of what would have been stressful for an imagined “average”
99
person. Importantly, creating a stressor criterion in the DSM has
100
For
spurred various checklists of potential traumatic stressors.
example, the Life Events Checklist (“LEC”) is a seventeen-item list of
101
events that is often used by psychiatrists applying the stressor criterion.
The LEC’s stressors are as follows:
(1) Natural disaster (for example, flood, hurricane, tornado,
earthquake)
(2) Fire or explosion
(3) Transportation accident (for example, car accident, boat accident,
train wreck, plane crash)
(4) Serious accident at work, home, or during recreational activity
(5) Exposure to toxic substance (for example, dangerous chemicals,
radiation)

97. See Am. Psychiatric Ass’n, Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders 236
(3d ed. 1980).
98. Richard J. McNally, Conceptual Problems with the DSM-IV Criteria for Posttraumatic Stress
Disorder, in Posttraumatic Stress Disorder: Issues and Controversies 1, 1–2 (Gerald M. Rosen ed.,
2004) (offering a chronology of the DSM’s approach to PTSD).
99. Breslau & Kessler, supra note 95, at 699. Although this initial “objective” approach was later
supplemented by a subjective criterion, the diagnostic work still starts from a search for a traumatic
event. See Am. Psychiatric Ass’n, Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders 463–64
(4th ed., Text Revision, 2000) (“Traumatic events . . . include, but are not limited to, military combat,
violent personal attack (sexual assault, physical attack, robbery, mugging), being kidnapped, being taken
hostage, terrorist attack, torture, incarceration as a prisoner of war or in a concentration camp, natural
or manmade disasters, severe automobile accidents, or being diagnosed with a life-threatening illness.”).
100. For a compressive description of many of those measuring instruments, see Suzan M. Orsillo,
Measures for Acute Stress Disorder and Posttraumatic Stress Disorder, in Practitioner’s Guide to
Empirically Based Measures of Anxiety 255 (Martin M. Antony et al. eds., 2001); see also Naomi
Breslau et al., Trauma and Posttraumatic Stress Disorder in the Community, 55 Archives Gen.
Psychiatry 626, 629 tbl.2 (1998); Breslau & Kessler, supra note 95, at 701 tbl.1 (both using empirically
a nineteen-item list that is based on the DSM’s stressor criterion).
101. Although the LEC’s list may seem lengthy, its importance to our topic—and more generally
the importance of similar inventories of traumatic stressors—seems to justify its inclusion here.
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(6) Physical assault (for example, being attacked, hit, slapped, kicked,
beaten up)
(7) Assault with a weapon (for example, being shot, stabbed,
threatened with a knife, gun, bomb)
(8) Sexual assault (rape, attempted rape, made to perform any type of
sexual act through force or threat of harm)
(9) Other unwanted or uncomfortable sexual experience
(10) Combat or exposure to a war-zone (in the military or as a civilian)
(11) Captivity (for example, being kidnapped, abducted, held hostage,
prisoner of war)
(12) Life-threatening illness or injury
(13) Severe human suffering
(14) [Witnessing] [s]udden, violent death (for example, homicide;
suicide)
(15) Sudden, unexpected death of someone close to you
(16) Serious injury, harm, or death you caused to someone else
102
(17) Any other stressful event or experience

Inventories of traumatic stressors, such as the LEC, can serve as a
professional and reliable resource to assist in the evaluation of stress
arguments, because they include stressors that have been professionally
recognized as predicting a stress disorder. Compare, as a brief example,
the stressors of Mary Ann Gascho, who was raped and beaten by her
103
then-husband, with the acknowledgment that sexual assaults (number 8
on the LEC inventory) and physical assaults (number 6) are traumatic
stressors.
A possible addition to inventories such as the LEC are stressors that
do not clearly meet the current threshold of the stressors criterion, but
are still severe enough to raise arguments in support of their inclusion.
PTSD’s theorists have argued, for example, that beyond the recognized
traumatic events, room should be made in the inventories for the
cumulative stress that occurs in cases such as repeated harassment at work
104
Although such
or prolonged care for a terminally ill partner.
recommendations have yet to be accepted, even stressors that potentially
result in PTSD can be evaluated as normative and universal stressors in
the context of stress arguments.

102. Matt J. Gray et al., Psychometric Properties of the Life Events Checklist, 11 Assessment 330,
339 (2004).
103. Gascho v. Scheurer Hosp., 400 F. App’x 978, 979–84 (6th Cir. 2010).
104. See, e.g., Chris R. Brewin et al., Reformulating PTSD for DSM-V: Life After Criterion A, 22 J.
Traumatic Stress 366, 368 (2009). But cf. Robert J. McNally, Progress and Controversy in the Study of
Posttraumatic Stress Disorder, 54 Ann. Rev. Psychol. 229, 231–32 (2003) (warning against a
conceptual bracket creep in the definition of trauma).
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2. Life Events as Stressors
Stress theorists have shown widespread interest in the properties of
events that make them stressful. Major life events, such as divorce or
being fired, have been recognized as universally stressful. Throughout
the second half of the twentieth century, researchers dedicated much
effort to identifying those life events and assessing their relative weight
as stressors. Such evaluation of events was mainly based on the amount
of readjustment individuals were required to do, the events’ desirability,
the stressors’ foreseeability, and the individuals’ ability to control their
105
occurrence. One pioneering tool of measurement was the Social
106
Readjustment Rating Scale (“SRRS”). The original SRRS listed fortythree such events and rated them by assigning numbers (called “lifechange units”)—ranging from 100 (death of spouse) to 11 (minor
107
violations of the law)—to each of them.
Crucial to the legal discussion of consenting under stress is realizing
that in the cases discussed earlier, the events that triggered the individuals’
stress arguments are ranked as significant stressors under the SRRS. For
example: Divorce is ranked second (out of forty-three) on the list and
assigned seventy-three life-change units; marriage is ranked seventh and
is assigned fifty units; being “fired at work” is the eighth event on the list
with forty-seven units; pregnancy is twelfth (forty units); and “change in
108
financial state” is sixteenth with thirty-eight units. Such a checklist
method is based on the idea that major changes in life can be measured
109
in an objective manner. Moreover, central to the SRRS’s measurement
of stress level is the idea that stressors accumulate. For example, if
someone who is going through a divorce also loses her job and
consequently suffers financial troubles due to the two events—similar to
110
the facts of Gascho —the units are cumulative and add up to a total of
158 life-change units to best capture the possible magnitude of their joint
impact. Although aspects of the SRRS were criticized by some stress
111
112
researchers, others relied on it and further refined it. Despite the lack

105. See generally Thomas H. Holmes & Richard H. Rahe, The Social Readjustment Rating Scale,
11 J. Psychosomatic Res. 213, 216 tbl.3 (1967).
106. See id.; see also Sheldon Cohen et al., Strategies for Measuring Stress in Studies of Psychiatric
and Physical Disorders, in Measuring Stress: A Guide for Health and Social Scientists 3, 3
(Sheldon Cohen et al. eds., 1995) [hereinafter Measuring Stress] (explaining that the SRRS belongs
with the environmental approach to the study of stress, which focuses on assessment of external events
or experiences that are “normatively (objectively) associated with substantial adaptive demands”).
107. Holmes & Rahe, supra note 105, at 216 tbl.3.
108. Id.
109. Barbara Anderson et al., Interview Assessment of Stressor Exposure, in Handbook of Stress
Science, supra note 85, at 565, 566.
110. Gascho v. Scheurer Hosp., 400 F. App’x 978, 980 (6th Cir. 2010).
111. See Cohen et al., supra note 106, at 5–6; see also R. Jay Turner & Blair Wheaton, Checklist
Measurement of Stressful Life Events, in Measuring Stress, supra note 106, at 36–37.
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113

of a universally agreed-upon list of stressors, the checklist methods of
measuring stress are still “the dominant research procedure” used in
114
thousands of empirical studies of exposure to stressors.
115
The value of the flourishing study of stressful life events in general,
and of the use of life event inventories in particular, to our topic seems
straightforward. It offers a well-researched—and empirically tested—list of
stressors and a relatively practical way to evaluate the credibility of any
given stress argument.
3. Chronic Stressors
In addition to short-term events, some enduring conditions produce
high levels of stress. Stressors in this group are chronic, and they put
humans under special demands that may lead not only to distress but also
to an exhaustion of resources that—in a vicious circle—causes greater
116
subsequent vulnerability to other stressors. As opposed to the life
events discussed above, the challenge here results not so much from the
need to adapt to changes, it stems from the ongoing requirement of
coping with difficult unchanging realities coming from poverty,
continuous unemployment, persistent financial worries, marital troubles,
disability, loneliness, and others. Chronic stressors are different from lifeevents stressors in the way they start, persist, and end. Specifically, they
don’t necessarily begin at a discrete moment, but rather may exist as a
“state” or develop insidiously as a problematic, continuing condition in
117
the social environment. They often persist for a long time, with

112. Such, for instance, was the 1977 study by Mardi Horowitz and his colleagues who created the
Life Events Questionnaires for measuring what they called “presumptive stress.” Mardi Horowitz et
al., Life Event Questionnaires for Measuring Presumptive Stress, 39 Psychosomatic Med. 413, 413
(1977). The SRRS itself was updated in 1997. See generally Mark A. Miller & Richard H. Rahe, Life
Changes Scaling for the 1990’s, 43 J. Psychosomatic Res. 279 (1997) (reporting updated findings with
regard to the original forty-three life change events from 1965, adding data from 1977 and 1995). With
the permission of the authors of the SRRS, everybody can now test and measure their stress level by
taking a simple (but telling) online test. See Life Change Stress Test, WebMD (May 18, 2011),
http://www.webmd.com/balance/stress-management/life-change-stress-test.
113. See Anderson et al., supra note 109, at 566.
114. Id. (explaining that checklists are used as either a stand-alone approach or combined with a
follow-up interview and maintaining that their popularity “appears to lie in the intuitive appeal of the
stress concept, the assumption that ‘more events are worse’ and the efficiency and economy of the
method”); see Pearlin, supra note 89, at 245 (describing life events inventories as an “inviting research
tool”).
115. Caroline Aldwin, Stress and Coping Across the Lifespan, in The Oxford Handbook of
Stress, Health and Coping 15, 18 (Suzan Folkman ed., 2010) (“Life events are most commonly
studied . . . .”).
116. Stephen J. Lepore, Measurement of Chronic Stressors, in Measuring Stress, supra note 106,
at 102.
117. Blair Wheaton, The Nature of Chronic Stress, in Coping with Chronic Stress 43, 53
(Benjamin H. Gottlieb ed., 1997).
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fluctuating intensity, sometimes cutting through different phases of life.
And, unlike life events, they usually do not come to a defined end. In
fact, while some chronic strains may gradually dissipate, others, such as
living in a dangerous neighborhood or suffering from discrimination, may
119
influence individuals from birth to death.
Due to all those characteristics of chronic stressors, the task of
organizing them in inventories and measuring their impact is a challenging
120
one. Yet as with life events, a universal aspect may be found in many of
the chronic stressors. Most people will find stressful, for example,
constantly lacking the money to pay the rent or mortgage, or facing
frequent conflicts with their spouse or their boss. In an effort to delineate
some standardization, stress theorists have found it useful to focus on
chronic strains that typically arise within the contexts of “major social
121
roles,” such as work, marriage, and parenthood. Difficulties at work,
problems with a spouse, and worries about kids are all significant chronic
stressors, according to this understanding, because of the way people are
invested—physically and psychologically—in their social roles. As a
result, inventories of chronic stressors tend to focus on strains at work
122
and within the family context.
Exploring patterns in inventories of chronic stressors appears
valuable to the ability to assess the reasonability and credibility of stress
arguments. Applying the social role idea, many people tend to share high
levels of stress that arise from some of the following: (1) overload in
123
fulfilling their role (be it at work or at home), (2) interpersonal conflicts
124
within their role (such as with their supervisor or their spouse),
125
(3) conflicts between roles (working parents are the prime example),
(4) unwanted roles (such as in the case of homemakers who would rather
126
have outside employment), (5) unachievable roles (inability to get a
127
job, to find a spouse, or to have children as leading examples), and

118. Id.
119. See id. at 69–71 (appendix).
120. See Pearlin, supra note 89, at 245 (describing the problem and suggesting focusing on those
chronic stressors that occur within roles); see also Lepore, supra note 116, at 106 (pointing to the
problem and reviewing available measuring instruments).
121. See, e.g., Pearlin, supra note 89, at 245.
122. Examples in the work context include the Work Environment Scale, the Occupational Stress
Inventory, and the Job Content Questionnaire. Examples in the marital/familial context include the
Family Environment Scale, the Marital Situations Inventory, and the Marital Agendas Protocol. See
Lepore, supra note 116, at 105–06.
123. Pearlin, supra note 89, at 245.
124. Id.
125. Id.
126. Id. (naming this category “role captivity”).
127. Wheaton, supra note 117, at 56–57 (underscoring the importance of not having a major social
role without including it in the role-oriented stressors). I believe that emphasizing the frustration of
not being able to achieve a desired role better explains the connection to stress.
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(6) loss of role (with examples that range from having to retire from
128
work to coping with empty nest after the children have left the home).
To this role-oriented inventory of chronic stressors, other scholars have
added more “general” strains, which cut across roles, such as residing in a
dangerous area, living in an air-polluted environment, or suffering from a
129
severe illness. Stress theorist Blair Wheaton, for example, has created a
sixty-item inventory that includes both role-related and more general
130
That inventory can be quite useful to legal
chronic stressors.
practitioners, judges, and legal theorists.
An instructive case can be that of Mr. Williams, who lived in
poverty his entire life, suffered from never-ending financial troubles and
found himself unable to feed his children or pay the bills when he agreed
131
to a problematic loan agreement. Realizing that Wheaton’s accepted
measuring instrument includes potential chronic stressors such as you
“don’t have the money to buy the things you or your kids need” and your
132
“rent or mortgage is too much” could have been helpful in assessing
Mr. Williams’s stress argument regarding his condition and his inability
to give meaningful consent.
C. Individual and Social Differences Explained
Thus far we have portrayed a relatively objective picture of stressors
without differentiating between individuals. However, even major
stressors are not always consistent in the effects that they produce. What is
it that changes the influence that similar stressors have over individuals?
For the most part, such differences can be explained and analyzed.
Contrary to the leading legal view, they do not demonstrate that stress is a
subjective phenomenon that is random in its impact on individuals.
1. Individual Differences
Richard Lazarus’s celebrated “appraisal theory of stress” explains
differences in individuals’ response to stressors and can offer salient
133
guidance. As distinct from the above effort to universalize stressors,
134
which is sometimes termed “the environmental approach,” the appraisal
theory emphasizes that for most stressors what is highly stressful for some
135
may not be as stressful for others. The differences between individuals

128. Pearlin, supra note 89, at 245–46 (naming this category “role restructuring”). I believe that
emphasizing the loss in the changing role better explains the connection to stress.
129. Wheaton, supra note 117, at 69–71 (appendix).
130. Id.
131. See Williams v. First Gov’t Mortg. & Investors Corp., 225 F.3d 738, 749 (D.C. Cir. 2000).
132. Wheaton, supra note 117, at 69 (appendix).
133. Lazarus & Folkman, supra note 91.
134. See supra note 106.
135. Lazarus & Folkman, supra note 91, at 19.
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are explained by their personal appraisal of the stressfulness of a given
situation. Thus, in their seminal 1984 book Stress Appraisal and Coping,
Lazarus and Folkman define stress not as an event but as “a relationship
between the person and the environment that is appraised by the person
as taxing or exceeding his or her resources and endangering his or her
136
well-being.”
The personal appraisal process is not, however, as capricious, erratic,
or unreliable as envisioned by some legal actors. It is a rich cognitive
categorization practice that Lazarus and other scholars have carefully
delineated in years of research. Their study focuses on two separate
evaluations: an appraisal of the significance of the stressor for the concrete
individual, followed by an appraisal of the resources available to that
137
individual to cope with what is assessed to be stressful. They show that
those “personal” appraisals follow recognizable patterns that can be
138
explained and that allow for intelligent investigation and analysis.
a.

Appraisal of Significance

Appraising the significance of stressors depends on both personal
and situational factors. On the personal level, the appraisal depends on
the relative importance of the stressful matter in one’s life, and this
importance depends on a concrete set of commitments and beliefs. As
conceptualized by Lazarus and Folkman, the “deeper a person’s
139
commitment, the greater the potential threat or harm.” Accordingly,
perceiving a matter as salient to their well-being tends to make people
140
particularly vulnerable to stress related to that matter. This principal of
relative significance can be very constructive in evaluating stress
arguments in legal cases. For example, a person losing her home due to
141
142
foreclosure or losing a job of thirty-five years is probably experiencing
her loss as larger than the loss of a real estate investment that has only
monetary value or a temporary job. Fortunately, the concrete significance
of a stressor in one’s life does not require mindreading skills, but only
willingness to analyze the particularities with special awareness to the
linkage between significance and stress.

136. Id.
137. Id. at 31–37. In 1984, Lazarus and Folkman decided to pragmatically continue using the
terminology of “Primary Appraisal” (for appraisal of significance) and “Secondary Appraisal” (for
appraisal of resources), despite their own dissatisfaction with such terminology. See id. at 31
(explaining the authors’ doubts). Therefore, I use different terminology: “Appraisal of Significance”
for their “Primary Appraisal” and “Appraisal of Resources” for their “Secondary Appraisal.”
138. Id.
139. Id. at 58.
140. Id. at 58–59.
141. See, e.g., In re Accredited Home Lender Holding Co., 441 B.R. 443 (2011).
142. See, e.g., Gascho v. Scheurer Hosp., 400 F. App’x 978 (6th Cir. 2010).

April 2013]

CONSENTING UNDER STRESS

705

Beyond the question of what is at stake personally, there are common
situational factors that can create differences in the appraisal of stressors.
It should be noted that these situational factors are all matters of fact—as
opposed to internal feelings—and therefore they lend themselves to legal
analysis and assessment. Many times the special weight of a stressor can be
explained not by personality factors, but rather by the phenomenon of
143
“clustering of stressors.” To fully appreciate the weight of stressors on
the individual, decisionmakers must bear in mind how stressors
144
accumulate, converge, and proliferate. Sometimes several stressors exist
independently of one another, but still have a cumulative effect. Consider,
for example, being exposed to a natural disaster while being unemployed.
Frequently, however, the stressors are strongly linked to each other, and
145
several “primary stressors” lead to “secondary stressors.” For example, a
loss of job can engender financial strains which may create or enhance
marital conflicts that can end in a divorce—generating a great sense of
loneliness and a new set of financial strains. As even this simplified
example illustrates, occasionally the primary stressors are less acute than
their consequential stressors, as the problem of stress tends to escalate
over time. Moreover, stressors typically cross over individuals. Thus, your
exposure to stress may be enhanced by exposure to stressors impacting
146
people close to you. An example, taken from a case in which the court
rejected the stress argument, is where a borrower’s ongoing financial
strains were intensified by his wife’s illness: Her stress spilled over and
147
enhanced the stress in his life.
Additionally, time-related situational factors often play a role in the
148
individual appraisal of stress. First, the imminence of a stressful event
or situation matters. While surprising negative changes may be stressful,
studies show that the anticipation period before the stress begins tends to
enhance the stressfulness by adding the weight of anxiety and worries to
the initial meaning of the nearing stressor. In those studies, the level of
stress appeared to reach its peak when “there was enough time for
subjects to grasp the significance of the threat, but not enough time to
143. Pearlin, supra note 89, at 248.
144. See Lazarus & Folkman, supra note 91, at 113 (explaining that the situation should “be
considered in the context of the person’s overall functioning, and in relation to what else is going on in
the person’s life”); see also Pearlin, supra note 89, at 247.
145. Pearlin, supra note 89, at 248.
146. See, e.g., Melissa A. Milkie, The Stress Process Model: Some Family-Level Considerations, in
Advances, supra note 89, at 93, 96 (giving the example of a stress transfer of an ill family member
whose situation inflicts stress on other family members); see also Nicole E. Roberts & Robert W.
Levenson, The Remains of the Workday: Impact of Job Stress and Exhaustion on Marital Interaction in
Police Couples, 63 J. Marriage & Family 1052, 1052 (2001) (“[J]ob stress and exhaustion can
negatively impact marriage.”).
147. DCR Fund I, LLC v. TS Family Ltd. P’ship, 261 F. App’x 139, 143 (10th Cir. 2008).
148. Lazarus & Folkman, supra note 91, at 92 (“[T]ime may be one of the most important
parameters of stressful situations, yet it has been one of the most neglected areas in stress research.”).
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generate effective coping strategies.” Second, the duration of the
stressful situation makes a difference, as suggested more generally by the
study of chronic stressors. When a stressful situation persists over time,
as in the case of ongoing financial strains, it is more likely to “wear the
150
person down psychologically and physically.” Third, uncertainty or
ambiguity about the nature of a threat, whether it will happen, and what
might be done about it, may also add to the potential stress in a given
151
situation. It can increase the level of threat by limiting the individual’s
sense of control and by intensifying the sense of helplessness, adding a
layer of anxiety that is often associated with uncertainty. Awareness of
this last point may help, for example, in evaluating the credibility of the
kind of stress argument made in Satter. In that case, an employee was
sent home to await the conclusion of an investigation committee, without
152
knowing for what she was being blamed. While the court cast doubt on
the stress argument by highlighting the fact that she was fully paid while
sitting at home, it reflected no awareness of the ambiguity of the
153
employee’s situation as a known enhancer of stress.
To sum up, we have seen how personal and situational factors can
lead to the assignment of different significance to similar stressors, either
enhancing or diminishing their impact. We have also seen that the
particular intensity of stressors derives, however, not only and not
predominantly from personal feelings. Rather, it emerges from given
conditions that can be cognitively assessed. Therefore, an appropriate
legal evaluation of a particular stress argument would require paying
attention to particular factual elements and balancing them, a task
familiar to most legal actors.
b.

Appraisal of Resources

Because people have different resources, they differ in their ability
to cope with stressful situations. Financial means, available familial and
social support, health, energy, education, and other skills, all dictate the
154
ability of an individual to cope with stressors. Generally, stressors have
greater potential to cause distress when the cognitive appraisal of the
individual leads to a conclusion that there are not enough resources to
cope. Lazarus and Folkman explain that the appraisal of resources
is more than a mere intellectual exercise in spotting all the things that

149. Id. at 95–96 (describing experiments by Nomikos and Folkins).
150. Id. at 98.
151. Id. at 101–03.
152. Satter v. Wash. State Dep’t of Ecology, No. C09-5645BHS, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 80520, at
*14–15 (W.D. Wash. Aug. 10, 2010).
153. Id.
154. Lazarus & Folkman, supra note 91, at 158–59 (defining resources as “factors that precede
and influence coping, which in turn mediates stress” and summarizing common coping resources).

April 2013]

CONSENTING UNDER STRESS

707

might be done. It is a complex evaluative process that takes into
account which coping options are available, the likelihood that a given
coping option will accomplish what it is supposed to, and the likelihood
155
that one can apply a particular strategy or set of strategies effectively.

The question of resources also depends on personal and situational
factors. At the personal level, individuals differ in the resources available
to them. When facing a cancellation of a wedding, for example, it matters
156
greatly whether the bride-to-be is unemployed or has her own savings
157
and sources of independent income to deal with the crisis. It also
158
matters whether she is alone in this country, like Ms. Holler and other
159
foreign brides, or has familial and other sources of social support.
While individual dispositions—such as optimism or self-esteem—are part
of the personal resources that allow or constrain the coping process (and
160
are admittedly less amenable to external assessment), most of the other
personal factors are recognizable and assessable.
Situational factors can also play a role in the appraisal of resources.
Time and timing, as a leading example, has much influence: While having
time can allow access to personal resources such as consultation and
social support, time pressure can constrain the ability to draw on
resources. For example, many of the brides-to-be that were pressured to
sign inferior prenuptial agreements were required to do so in the last few
days before the wedding and therefore had very limited ability to cope
161
with the stressor they were facing.
c.

A Summary and a Comment About Feelings

Individual differences in experiencing stress do exist, and the
judicial review of a stress argument cannot remain general: It requires
taking into account the concrete aspects of the problem, both personal
and situational. The appraisal theory’s greatest contribution may have
been to the debate whether stress is objective, as suggested by inventories
of common stressors, or subjective, as suggested by the fact that individuals
respond differently to similar stressors. The appraisal theory suggests that
both conceptions are true, but neither can fully describe the causes of
155. Id. at 35.
156. See, e.g., Holler v. Holler, 612 S.E.2d 469, 471 (S.C. Ct. App. 2005).
157. See, e.g., In re Marriage of Spiegel, 553 N.W.2d 309, 311 (Iowa 1996) (bride is an educated
business woman with some income).
158. Holler, 612 S.E.2d at 471 (bride from Ukraine).
159. See, e.g., In re Marriage of Bonds, 5 P.3d 815 (Cal. 2000) (bride from Sweden); see also Friezo
v. Friezo, 914 A.2d 533 (Conn. 2007) (bride from England).
160. Although scholars and experts do analyze and assess them on a regular basis. See, e.g.,
Michele M. Tugade, Positive Emotions and Coping: Examining Dual-Process Models of Resilience, in
The Oxford Handbook of Stress, Health and Coping, supra note 115.
161. See, e.g., Francavilla v. Francavilla, 969 So. 2d 522, 524 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2007) (agreement
signed an hour before the wedding); see also Friezo, 914 A.2d at 542 (agreement signed one day before
the wedding).
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stress. Instead, it offers a view of the process as a dynamic transaction
between personal components and environmental elements, a mixture of
162
objective and subjective properties. This transactional model currently
dominates the study of stress and admittedly requires deviation from a
163
purely objective approach. However, it should not render impossible
the legal task of analyzing stress arguments. Long years of studies offer
enough understanding of the patterns of individual responses to stressful
events to allow informed evaluation.
Finally, the appraisal approach does not deny the place of emotions in
the process. However, “emotions” under this approach are not disparaged,
164
as in the legal approach, as merely a subjective feeling; instead, emotions
are conceptualized as an integral and important part of an efficient
cognitive process. For example, a wife’s love for her husband is a relevant
factor in the appraisal of the stress caused by the husband’s announcement
that he wants a divorce. Without such emotion, when the wife shares the
fading of affection and devotion, divorce may be unpleasant but not an
experience that necessarily creates a new stressful condition. As this
example shows, the question of love is relevant to the cognitive appraisal
of the potential stressor of divorce. Indeed, the study of emotions
demonstrates that emotions play a vital part in a productive cognitive
165
process, and therefore should not be ignored. So, although there is no
doubt that emotions are—and indeed should be—involved in the
appraisal process, it does not justify defining stress as a “feeling” that
cannot by analyzed.
2. Social Differences
Another reason why stress-related arguments can still be assessed in
courts despite their seemingly individuated character is the strong link
between stress and social conditions. The social study of stress has focused
on people’s backgrounds to identify social patterns and to enable analysis
166
of the structural elements that make up the stress process. Inspired by
Pearlin’s Stress Process model, social studies have repeatedly illustrated
that differences in stress experiences can often be explained by “the
effects of social inequality on allocations of resources, status, and

162. Lazarus & Folkman, supra note 91, at 114.
163. See Aldwin, supra note 115, at 17 (stating the dominance of the transactional model).
164. See Satter v. Wash. State Dep’t of Ecology, No. C09-5645BHS, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 80520,
at *16 (W.D. Wash. Aug. 10, 2010).
165. See, e.g., Antonio R. Damasio, Descartes’ Error: Emotion, Reason and the Human Brain
xv (1994) (arguing that emotions are forms of intelligent awareness that are “just as cognitive as other
percepts”); see also Terry A. Maroney, The Persistent Cultural Script of Judicial Dispassion, 99 Calif.
L. Rev. 645–49 (2011) (reviewing arguments and literature that explain how emotion plays a critical
role in reasoning, rationality, and moral judgment).
166. Pearlin, supra note 89, at 241–43.
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167

power.” Social studies research has demonstrated how social factors
such as gender, race, and socioeconomic status color the stress picture
168
and create patterned differences between individuals.
a.

Gender

Patterns of exposure and vulnerability to stressors seem to follow
169
the “gender line.” While research shows that males are more exposed
and vulnerable to stress caused by, for example, physical violence, war
traumas, and unemployment, females tend to suffer from increased
exposure and vulnerability to stress that rises, for instance, from sexual
170
violence, interpersonal relationships, and caregiving duties. Those
patterns clearly correlate with the conventional allocation of life domains
between women and men. Despite many changes in gender roles, men in
the twenty-first century are still more likely to be the primary providers
of the financial resources of their family and are expected by others and
171
by themselves to fulfill that role. Similarly, women are still more likely
to be the primary homemakers and caretakers of children and aging
adults, and are still expected (by others and by themselves) to satisfy the
172
requirements of domestic roles.
Such a gendered social setting obviously exposes more women than
men to “private-life” and domestic stressors and more men than women to
“public-life” and market stressors. But the differences go deeper, beyond
the environments occupied by men and women, to invade individuals’
173
internal worlds and the way they “define and evaluate themselves.”
Individuals experience stress more in particular domains because
performance in those domains is more significant in their lives and is more
important to their sense of self. Thus the gendered reality modifies the
meaning individuals assign to general stressors. It also changes the
personal resources they use to cope with such stressors. Indeed, the study
of stress has produced some findings that are relevant to the legal
evaluation of stress arguments made in courts by men and women.
Perhaps the most consistent and pronounced pattern reported in the
stress literature is that females are influenced more than males by

167. R. Jay Turner et al., The Epidemiology of Social Stress, 60 Am. Soc. Rev. 104, 106 (1995).
168. Id. Other contexts were studied too. See, e.g., Elizabeth G. Menaghan, Work, Family and
Their Intersection, in Advances, supra note 89, at 131, 131–48 (lack of education and problems of
personal status).
169. See generally Nancy Levit, The Gender Line (1998).
170. See Vicki S. Helgeson, Gender, Stress, and Coping, in The Oxford Handbook of Stress,
Health and Coping, supra note 115, at 63, 63–70.
171. Id.
172. Id.
173. Mary C. Davis et al., Gender: Its Relationship to Stressor Exposure, Cognitive Appraisal/
Coping Processes, Stress Responses, and Health Outcomes, in Handbook of Stress Science, supra note
85, at 247, 247.
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interpersonal stressors. This important finding can be explained by
females’ greater exposure to and investment in interpersonal situations—
such as through raising children—and even more so by their
interdependent definition of the self, where risks to significant relationships
as well as stressors encountered by close others are experienced as
175
stressful for them. Conversely, males’ self-identity is more tied to an
independent definition of self with more emphasis on autonomy and,
therefore, this tends to make men less vulnerable to comparable
interpersonal stressors. Such consistent empirical results—supported by at
least 119 survey studies of over 83,000 individuals and never
176
contradicted —should definitely be taken into account when assessing the
likelihood of sincerity when a woman is making a stress argument based
on severe interpersonal problems in her life. Such reports reflect a
recognized social phenomenon and not a random collection of individual
sentiments, and these reports suggest that more credibility should be given
177
to stress arguments that match those established patterns.
Interestingly, job-related stressors have a different impact on the
genders, one which does not precisely mirror interpersonal stressors. In
fact, women usually report more job-related events that cause stress than
men. However, before concluding that women are simply more sensitive to
178
stress than men, it should be noted that women’s vulnerability arises
from their general lower status at work, as “women are more often
179
employed in occupations that entail high demands and low control.”
Accordingly, when researchers control for occupational status and
compare women and men in equivalent jobs, the differences seem to
180
disperse. One job-related stressor, however, that has greater impact on
181
men than on women is unemployment or the loss of a job. The same
logic that explains women’s special vulnerability to interpersonal stressors
seems to be in effect when it comes to men’s unemployment. Since
providing for one’s family and having an autonomous status is at the core
of the traditional view of masculinity and at the heart of many men’s selfidentity, the meaning of job losses and prolonged unemployment periods
182
appears to be more dramatic for men.

174. Id. at 248.
175. Id.; see Helgeson, supra note 170, at 67.
176. Davis et al., supra note 173, at 248.
177. This suggestion is based on the empirical findings and made without taking a position on the
robust debate within feminist legal theory about whether women are, by biology or socialization, more
oriented toward interpersonal connection than men.
178. For example, the literature shows that men are more vulnerable to traumatic stressors. See
Davis et al., supra note 173, at 249–50; Helgeson, supra note 170, at 64–65.
179. Davis et al., supra note 173, at 250.
180. Id. at 250.
181. Helgeson, supra note 170, at 64, 70–71.
182. Id.
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The distinctive experiences of stress in the lives of women and men
should be considered when evaluating individual stress arguments. Gender
taken as a social stressor may explain differences in individuals’ response
to stressors without making their argument “subjective” in an arbitrary
sense. Consequentially, more credibility should be given, for example,
when the stress argument is coming from a man that was exposed to
violence or a job loss or from a woman that was exposed to sexual
harassment or a harsh divorce.
b.

Race

Racism is still a grave and pervasive social problem, and as such it has
a significant impact on individuals’ experiences of stress. Racial
discrimination or other mistreatment is now accepted by stress theorists as
183
an independent cause of chronic stress. Race-related stress as an
enduring condition develops in a process that begins with discriminatory
events. Although the initial racist personal experiences may vary in their
184
origins, forms, frequency, and covertness, they eventually generate a
185
general and persistent vulnerability to stress. Sometimes the racist
experiences are so frequent and significant that they create enduring stress
in and of themselves. At other times, even a few isolated events—when
186
joined with collective experiences and historical injustices —can trigger
transformations in cognition, behavior, and psychological perceptions.
These events then tend to increase the vulnerability to racial stressors.
An individual who was hurt by racist experiences may therefore appraise
187
later racist events as more significant and threatening. The same
individual may interpret the meaning of further ambiguous episodes as
188
“threatening instances of ethnic discrimination,” even when, in the
absence of these past experiences, such episodes may not appear so
189
devastating.
In addition, race may deplete coping resources. One of the damages
of years of institutional, cultural, and interpersonal race discrimination is
183. See generally Elizabeth Brondolo et al., Racism as a Psychological Stressor, in Handbook of
Stress Science, supra note 85, at 167; see also Shelly P. Harrell, A Multidimensional Conceptualization of
Racism-Related Stress: Implications for the Well-Being of People of Color, 70 Am. J. Orthopsychiatry 42
(2000).
184. Those include discriminatory institutional policies, derogating messages conveyed by the
media, and personal expressions of prejudice.
185. Harrell, supra note 183, at 54.
186. Id. at 46–47 (stating that stress is enhanced by collective experiences, when one perceives that
the racial group with which she identifies is generally not treated fairly, and by historical injustices,
when individuals believe that the group with which they identify has been historically mistreated or
oppressed).
187. See Rodney Clark et al., Racism as a Stressor for African Americans: A Biopsychosocial Model,
54 Am. Psychologist 805 (1999).
188. Brondolo et al., supra note 183, at 171.
189. Harrell, supra note 183, at 45.
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a segregated reality. Minorities are more likely than other groups to live in
impoverished areas in which the environmental conditions include poor
education, relative lack of social support, scarce recreational opportunities,
190
and inadequate health services. Clearly, such an impoverished reality not
only creates more stressors, but also plays a role in draining coping
capabilities. Maya Angelou opens her story Wouldn’t Take Nothing for
My Journey Now with a compelling description of such race-related
stressful reality. She writes, “In 1903 the late Mrs. Annie Johnson of
Arkansas found herself with two toddling sons, very little money, a slight
ability to read and add simple numbers. To this picture add a disastrous
191
marriage and the burdensome fact that Mrs. Johnson was a Negro.”
To make things even worse, the racial stress itself, by its own toxic
nature, not only impairs environmental and social resources, it also tends
to disrupt and weaken the most personal coping resources such as self192
esteem, agency, and hopeful disposition. Moreover, because racism is
“an uncontrollable stressor,” it often leads people to develop a sense of
193
helplessness that further limits their resilience. Finally, since racism is
frequently associated with depressive symptoms—and depression is
known to reduce social participation, cognitive flexibility, and energy—
many minority individuals are even less equipped to cope with the many
194
stressors in their lives.
Because of chronic race-related stressors and race-related limited
coping resources, non-white individuals arguing that they were
encumbered by stress should not be heard as voicing an individual and
subjective claim. Rather, the place of race as a social stressor should be
acknowledged and taken into account in evaluating the credibility and
intensity of stress arguments made by minorities.
c.

Socioeconomic Status and a Summary

Low social status also creates or enhances stress, as it impairs coping
resources. Generally, exposure to stressors and problems in coping with
195
them increase “as one goes down the social hierarchy.” This has much

190. Id. at 46.
191. Maya Angelou, New Directions, in Wouldn’t Take Nothing for My Journey Now 19, 21
(1994).
192. See Clifford L. Broman et al., The Experience and Consequences of Perceived Racial
Discrimination: A Study of African Americans, 26 J. Black Psychol. 165–79 (2000) (reporting lower
levels of perceived mastery); Vanessa M. Nyborg & John F. Curry, The Impact of Perceived Racism:
Psychological Symptoms Among African American Boys, 32 J. Clinical Child & Adolescent
Psychol. 258, 259 (2003) (reporting higher levels of hopelessness in Black adolescents).
193. Brondolo et al., supra note 183, at 177.
194. Id.
195. Tarani Chandola & Michael G. Marmot, Socioeconomic Status and Stress, in Handbook of
Stress Science, supra note 85, at 185, 192. See Turner et al., supra note 167, at 115 (“[T]hese results
support the conclusion that exposure to stress tends to occur differentially for those differently
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to do with the lack of control that characterizes a lower social status; it
causes greater vulnerability to stress due to universal reasons, such as
economic and social powerlessness, and to more personal reasons such as
196
lower self-confidence.
To summarize this social dimension of stress, the individual
experience of stress is seldom merely personal and is rarely unique. Strong
social pressures emerging from defined contexts such as gender, race, and
social status create patterns of difference. Moreover, studies have shown
that the accumulation of such social factors—as in the case of single
197
mothers —adds depth and weight to the problem. Appreciating what
198
theorists have called “the social distribution of stress” can assist
decisionmakers seeking to evaluate the credibility of stress arguments; it
can free them from the limiting notion that stress is too private, subjective,
199
and internal to be assessed.
D. Outcomes of Stress with a Focus on Consenting
Prolonged stress can produce both immediate and longer-term
consequences that run the gamut from the physiological, to the cognitive,
to the psychological. In many disciplines, the study of stress has mainly
focused on the negative effect of distress on people’s health and wellbeing. Years of studies have produced a body of findings too vast to be
200
summarized here. Instead, this Subpart will first explore particular
biological outcomes of stress that can potentially inform the legal
approach to stress arguments. It then will focus on the impact of stress on
an individual’s decisionmaking process, which can lead a party to consent
to a contract that she might otherwise not accept.
1. The Biological Outcomes of Stress
The biological study of the outcomes of stress makes clear that legal
actors can no longer describe stress as a feeling. In fact, research has shown
situated in the social hierarchy.”).
196. Thompson, supra note 84, at 128–29 (citing studies of baboons, dogs, human beings in the Postal
Service, and others that associate lower status and lower sense of control with higher levels of stress).
197. William Avison’s interesting body of work focusing on single mothers offers a vivid example
of the accumulation of social stressors. His studies show that single mothers suffer from the
combination of stressors typical to gender, low social status, and often race, and therefore are
significantly more exposed and vulnerable to stress. See, e.g., William R. Avison, Family Structure and
Women’s Life: A Life Course Perspective, in Advances, supra note 89, at 71–92.
198. Turner et al., supra note 167, at 106.
199. Research focusing on personality differences highlights two main qualities that make some
people more resilient than others to stress: hardiness and having a sense of control (or mastery). See,
e.g., Lazarus & Folkman, supra note 91, at 212.
200. It shows, inter alia, that distress is strongly associated with a variety of severe diseases, with
speeding the aging and the death of brain cells, and with the development of mental illness. See, e.g.,
Shawn Talbott, The Cortisol Connection: Why Stress Makes You Fat and Ruins Your
Health—And What You Can Do About It 81 (2007).
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that the chain of dichotomies shaping traditional western thinking simply
do not work in the context of stress. Pairs of concepts—such as body/soul,
reason/emotion, physiology/psychology, and objective/ subjective—are
never opposites when it comes to stress. Rather, the concepts overlap and
interrelate such that they cause changes to numerous human systems.
Think, for instance, about a family man under threat of losing his job.
When his brain perceives the stressful events, its cognitive appraisal of the
situation triggers a chemical response: the release of a cascade of “stress
201
hormones”—such as adrenaline and cortisol. Those hormones then
“initiate a series of other chemical changes, as well as physiological,
202
cognitive, emotional, physical, and behavioral changes.” Now the man
may suffer from some physical symptoms, such as headaches, lack of sleep,
weight gain, and higher blood pressure. All of these are known results of
overexposure to stress hormones. Psychologically, he may also become less
patient with the people around him, more moody, perhaps even depressed,
and this might add to the work-related situation or to personal problems at
home. If the problems persist and become chronic, the constant presence
of stress hormones will cause additional physiological and psychological
problems. Those may include an inability to turn off the stress response,
203
leading to even more exposure to those hormones. Thus, at the most
fundamental level, recognizing the connection between stressful situations
and overexposure to stress hormones can help legal actors conceptualize
the problem of stress as much more than a feeling. The next step is to
recognize the common symptoms of overexposure to stress hormones,
which can assist both in structuring and in evaluating stress arguments.

201. For the evolutionary role of adrenaline and cortisol as essential to the known “flight or flight”
mechanism, see id. at ch. 3; see also id. at 31 (“Adrenaline is responsible for the ‘up’ feeling that causes
excitement, while cortisol is responsible for modulating the way our bodies use various fuel sources.”).
Adrenaline, also known by its American name, epinephrine, is one of the two main hormones secreted
in response to stress by the sympathetic nervous system (the other one being noradrenaline). Cortisol
is one of the most known hormones in a group of hormones called “glucocorticoids” that are secreted
by the adrenal gland following the release of special hormones in the brain. The full description of the
different hormones that play a role in times of stress is beyond the scope of this Article. Robert
Sapolsky offers a fascinating detailed explanation to general audiences. In a nutshell, once a stressor is
recognized, two waves of hormonal response follow: “Epinephrine acts within seconds; glucocorticoids
back this activity up over the course of minutes or hours.” Robert M. Sapolsky, Why Zebras Don’t
Get Ulcers: The Acclaimed Guide to Stress, Stress-Related Diseases, and Coping, 30–31 (3d ed.
2004) (“Together, glucocorticoids and the secretions of the sympathetic nervous system (epinephrine
and norepinephrine) account for a large percentage of what happens in your body during stress.”). For
the sake of simplicity, those waves of hormones with their orchestrated secretion will hereinafter be
called “the stress hormones.”
202. Thompson, supra note 84, at 114.
203. Id. at 116.
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Insomnia

Chronic inability to sleep is a known result of stress, and it can be
explained by high levels of stress hormones. Biologist Robert Sapolsky’s
204
acclaimed and fascinating book Why Zebras Don’t Get Ulcers
205
emphasized this symptom, adding that “75 percent of cases of insomnia
206
are triggered by some major stressor.” As Sapolsky maintains, “stress
not only can decrease the total amount of sleep but can compromise the
207
quality of whatever sleep you do manage.” The connection between
stress and sleeping problems is explained by the fluctuating levels of
cortisol in our bodies. Under normal conditions, the highest levels of this
stress hormone are present in our bodies during the early morning,
208
helping us to wake up and face the tasks of the day. Those levels are
supposed to decline throughout the day, eventually allowing us to calm
209
down enough when the time comes to get some sleep. However,
chronic stress prevents this healthy decline of cortisol and causes high
210
levels of it all day long, leading to interrupted sleep. A vicious circle
follows: Sleep deprivation is not only a symptom of stress, but also a
universal stressor that in turn contributes to even higher levels of cortisol
211
and, therefore, more problems sleeping. Recognizing insomnia as a
symptom of stress could have been useful in Gascho, in which the
plaintiff’s stress argument was supported by undisputed evidence
212
regarding a severe—and professionally medicated—sleeping problem.
Accordingly, the scientifically documented “cortisol connection” between
stress and sleeping problems could assist courts in the evaluation of stress
arguments in cases that include proven insomnia.
b.

Depression

Another known symptom of stress that is associated with excessive
stress hormones is depression. Sapolsky’s work has highlighted this tight
213
tie, and as more recent works show, “it is evident that an inexorable link

204. Sapolsky, supra note 201.
205. Id. at 226–38.
206. Id. at 236.
207. Id.
208. Talbott, supra note 200, at 99.
209. Id.
210. Id.
211. Sapolsky, supra note 201, at 227 (“Not getting enough sleep is a stressor; being stressed
makes it harder to sleep. Yup, we’ve got a dread vicious cycle on our hands.”).
212. Gascho v. Scheurer Hosp., 400 F. App’x 978, 980 (6th Cir. 2010) (noting that, at the time of
contracting, Ms. Gascho was taking Lunesta, Ambien, Benadryl, and Ultram to help her sleep). See
Satter v. Wash. State Dep’t of Ecology, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 80520, at *16 (W.D. Wash. Aug. 10,
2010) (reporting a stress reaction that included an inability to sleep).
213. See generally Sapolsky, supra note 201, at 271–308 (discussing the strong ties of stress and
depression); see also Talbott, supra note 200, at 23 (describing the linkage between over- and under-
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exists between stress and depression, and new research has dramatically
214
increased our understanding of the relationship between the two.” This
strong bond between stress and depression is critical to our topic in at least
two ways. First and most basically, since distressed parties seeking relief
sometimes present evidence with regard to their diagnosed depression,
realizing that stress often causes depression can make their argument
significantly more credible. As with stress, depression is not merely a
feeling, and although we all get truly upset from time to time, diagnosed
depression is different: It is a medically acknowledged disease with
215
severe, sometimes life-threatening, consequences. Thus, when a party
describes high levels of stress that led to a diagnosis of depression, courts
can benefit from the rapidly accumulating knowledge that shows how
216
typical such a connection is.
Second, when people are under stress combined with depression,
there is very little they can actively do. There is a proven connection
between stress, depression, and impaired agency. A frequent feature of
major depression is “psychomotor retardation”—a severe decrease in the
ability to concentrate or act, which makes even simple activities, such as
making an appointment or getting dressed in the morning, exhausting and
217
nearly impossible to accomplish. Furthermore, stress and depression are
218
that is, an
also associated with cognitive “learned helplessness,”
inclination to surrender to one’s situation out of “a distortive belief that
219
there is no control or outlets in any circumstance.” Studies have shown
that by overgeneralizing the meaning of a particular stressful situation, the
distressed tend to extend the original helplessness and conclude that
there is nothing that can be done even if others can see possible paths of
220
action. Given the impact of stress and depression, it is much more
explicable why the alternative to “stand pat and fight,” which many
221
courts view as reasonable, is quite clearly out of the realm of possible
responses for many of those who are depressed.

exposure to cortisol and stress-related depression).
214. David A. Gutman & Charles B. Nemeroff, Stress and Depression, in Handbook of Stress
Science, supra note 85, at 345, 353.
215. The study of depression is, of course, beyond the scope of this Article. However, it seems to
me as if the legal disregard of depression has a high correlation to the legal disregard of stress.
216. Stress arguments are often accompanied by arguments and evidence regarding depression.
Currently many courts disregard that aspect of the argument even when the depression is severe and
well proved. For a recommendation of a different approach, see infra Part III.
217. Sapolsky, supra note 201, at 275.
218. See generally Martin E. P. Seligman, Helplessness: On Depression, Development, and
Death (1975) (one of the most influential works in psychology in general and the definitive book on
the subject of learned helplessness in particular); see also Sapolsky, supra note 201, at 494–95 (offering
a review of learned helplessness literature in the context of stress and depression).
219. Sapolsky, supra note 201, at 305.
220. Id. at 301–02.
221. See supra note 39 and accompanying text.
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2. Stress and Impaired Decisionmaking
Consenting to a contract is a product of a decisionmaking process.
Such a view is supported by the legal doctrines of duress, unconscionability,
and undue influence—in their shared requirement that the party seeking
relief prove she has no reasonable alternative to agreement.
Understanding the impact of stress on the effectiveness of that
decisionmaking processes and any available alternatives to agreeing is thus
important. As we shall now see, when stress is present the legal
presumption that the availability of alternatives means that the consenting
party made a meaningful choice is frequently unsound.
a.

The General Effect of Stress on Decisionmaking

Some stress studies show that prolonged stress can “wreak havoc
222
with decision making.” Although the intersection of decisionmaking
223
models and stress theories is yet to be fully developed, stress theorists
224
believe that chronic stress can lead to dysfunctional decisionmaking.
Specifically, judgments made under stress are limited because the brain is
consumed by the need to cope with the stressors and their outcomes.
Studies of the impact of stress on cognition began following World
War II and resulted in an expressed consensus that the “competence of
225
human judgment is decreased by stress.” Only the recent development of
the neurosciences, however, has allowed researchers access to the
processes in the brain triggered by exposure to stress. The current findings,
albeit not conclusive, reveal how stress impairs high-order brain abilities
that are essential for effective decisionmaking—specifically, those
operations performed by the prefrontal cortex (“PFC”). Under nonstress conditions, the PFC orchestrates the “intelligent regulation of
226
behaviour, thought and emotion.” Under conditions of psychological
stress, however, stress hormones interfere with that regulation.
Evolutionarily geared to prepare the body for a fight-or-flight
227
response, those hormones limit the ability of the brain to do other, less
urgent tasks. Specifically, they work to limit memory and attention
regulation as well as other complex brain activities performed by the

222. Thompson, supra note 84, at 117.
223. Hammond, supra note 85, at 25–27 (describing the gulf that separates theorists of stress from
decisionmaking researchers).
224. See Eduardo Dias-Ferreira et al., Chronic Stress Causes Frontostriatal Reorganization and
Affects Decision-Making, 325 Science 621, 621–25 (2009).
225. Hammond, supra note 85, at 6. See generally Irving L. Janis & Leon Mann, Decision Making:
A Psychological Analysis of Conflict, Choice, and Commitment (1977).
226. Amy F. T. Arnsten, Stress Signaling Pathways That Impair Prefrontal Cortex Structure and
Function, 10 Nat. Rev. Neurosci. 410, 411 (2009).
227. Id. at 412.
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228

PFC. Therefore, under stress conditions, the amount and quality of
229
information we can recall, process, and store declines. At the same time,
the high levels of stress hormones strengthen the function of other
regions of the brain; the hormones released under stress “switch the
brain from thoughtful, reflective regulation by the PFC to more rapid
230
reflexive regulation by the amygdala and other subcortical structures.”
While such a brain process may be efficient when people are under a
physical threat, it is fundamentally detrimental when they are expected
to make rational choices requiring analysis, self-control, and long-term
231
232
thinking. It can lead to dysfunctional decisionmaking.
b.

The Specific Impact of Stress on the Evaluation of
Alternatives

Since the legal analysis of decisions made under stress depends on
the analysis under the reasonable alternative test, understanding the
impact of stress not only on the final decision, but also more particularly
on one’s ability to recognize and assess existing alternatives, becomes
important. While careful appraisal of alternatives is essential to every
233
appropriate decision, it is very difficult to sustain under stress when one
234
“can’t think straight.” Again, the problem stems from the release of
stress hormones. They cause arousal that in turn creates “hypervigilance”:
hasty and impulsive patterns of behavior that lead to ineffective
decisionmaking. Such patterns were observed in an experimental study
that focused specifically on the way stress influences the scanning and
235
consideration of available alternatives.
The alternatives study compared “the manner in which stressed and
236
unstressed individuals consider and scan decision alternatives,” and it is
often cited in the decisionmaking literature to explain how stress limits
237
the ability to choose between alternatives. One hundred and one

228. Id.
229. Thompson, supra note 84, at 136.
230. Arnsten, supra note 226, at 415.
231. Id. In addition, chronic prolonged stress may even lead to structural, longer term changes in
the PFC. Id. at 418–19.
232. See Dias-Ferreira et al., supra note 224.
233. Irving L. Janis, Decisionmaking Under Stress, in Handbook of Stress: Theoretical and
Clinical Aspects 60 (Leo Goldberger & Shlomo Bereznitz eds., 2d ed. 1993) (describing the vigilance
that is required to cope with stress and stating that vigilance exists when “the decision maker searches
painstakingly for relevant information . . . and appraises alternatives carefully before making a
choice”).
234. Thompson, supra note 84, at 159.
235. See generally Giora Keinan, Decision Making Under Stress: Scanning of Alternatives Under
Controllable and Uncontrollable Threats, 52 J. Personality & Soc. Psychol. 639 (1987).
236. Id. at 640.
237. See, e.g., Hammond, supra note 85, at 170–76, 216; Dan Zakay, The Impact of Time Perception
Processes on Decision Making Under Time Stress, in Time Pressure and Stress in Human Judgment
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students participated in the study and took a computerized multiple238
choice analogies test containing fifteen questions. Students were asked
to choose the correct answer out of six alternatives presented separately
239
on the screen. They were able to navigate freely between the reviewed
240
alternatives and to control both the order and the speed of their review.
To choose one of the alternatives, the students had to press the enter key,
241
which then prompted the display of the next question on the screen. The
time that the students spent reviewing each alternative as well as the
sequence by which the alternatives were visited were recorded. The goal
was mainly to trace the method of deciding rather than to simply measure
the quality of the end result. The participants were randomly divided to
groups: Some were only asked to do their best, while others had to take
242
the test under stress created as part of the experiment. Importantly, the
stressed participants were put under stress without using time pressure:
They were free to review each alternative for as much time as they
needed and to revisit alternatives that seemed to require more attention.
Instead, the stressor chosen for this study was the threat of electric
243
shock. While time pressure would predictably yield a rushed style of
244
decisionmaking, it may be less comprehensible how being under a
different kind of stress impacts the analysis of alternatives.
The results of the alternatives study were remarkable. The
participants under stress demonstrated a significantly inferior performance
compared to their non-stressed counterparts. First, stress had the
detrimental effect of “premature closure,” defined as making a decision
245
before all available alternatives were considered. Although few nonstressed participants engaged in premature closure, 80% of the cases in
which alternatives were ignored occurred among the distressed
246
subjects. In fact, many of those subjects “chose an answer before they
247
had even seen the correct alternative.” The study’s findings regarding
premature closure lend support to works describing the effect of stress
on attention in which the cognitive process is impaired by a “tunnel
and Decision Making 60 (Ola Svenson & A. John Maule eds., 1993).
238. Keinan, supra note 235, at 640.
239. Id.
240. Id.
241. Id.
242. Id. at 641.
243. Id.
244. Much work has been dedicated to time pressure as a stressor that impairs decisionmaking.
See, e.g., Janis & Mann, supra note 225, at 59 (examining the role of imminence within the context of
decisionmaking processes and stating that the quality of decisionmaking depends on the answer to the
question: “Is there sufficient time to make a careful search for an evaluation of information and
advice?”); see also Lazarus & Folkman, supra note 91, at 93.
245. Keinan, supra note 235, at 639.
246. Id. at 642.
247. Id. at 643.
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vision,” that is, an inclination to only focus on limited dimensions of a
given problem.
Second, stress also caused “nonsystematic scanning,” defined as a
disorganized and scattered method of review in which the stressed
decisionmaker “searches frantically for a way out of the dilemma, and
248
rapidly shifts back and forth between alternatives.” Recording every
249
departure from a serial sequence of review, the study demonstrated
significantly deficient scanning patterns in the distressed groups.
Compared to the non-stressed participants, subjects under stress visited
250
the alternative answers in a much more scattered and disordered fashion.
Finally, in terms of “quality of performance,” defined as choosing
the right answers, subjects under stress decided incorrectly at a higher
251
rate than their counterparts. Notably, the distressed were not simply
wrong more often. The study also showed a strong correlation between
incomplete patterns of scanning of alternatives and decreased quality of
performance: 67% of the cases of premature closure, for example, led to
252
choosing an incorrect answer. This last point has a palpable link to the
legal stress argument. Typically, parties seeking relief and stress-sensitive
judges attempt to explain the mistaken decision to consent to a
disadvantageous contract by the failure to engage in an appropriate
consideration process. The alternatives study supports the reasonableness
of that argument.
The alternatives study demonstrates that stress significantly impairs
253
the consideration of alternatives and leads to flawed decisions. The
application of these findings to the evaluation of contractual stress
arguments in general, and more specifically to the “reasonable alternative”
test, is notable. It suggests that judges may base their conclusions
regarding the quality of apparent consent on alternatives not truly
available to distressed individuals. Such a possibility clearly undermines
the conventional presumption that the “reasonable alternative” test is
objective. It thus also suggests that the application of the alternative test
to distressed individuals requires adjustment to take into account the fact
that stress distorts the “consenter’s” understanding of such alternatives.
All in all, this Part has shown that the conventional legal analysis of
consenting under stress cannot be reconciled with the results other
disciplines have produced in their study of stress. The conflict mainly exists

248. Id. at 639 (citing Janis, supra note 233, at 72).
249. Id. at 641 (explaining the measurement of that aspect of the performance).
250. Id. at 642.
251. Id.
252. Id.
253. Although the nature of the experiment did not require lengthy consideration of each of the
alternatives, other works also demonstrate that stress shortens the time dedicated to the assessment of
each alternative. See id. at 640–43 (discussing “temporal narrowing”).

April 2013]

CONSENTING UNDER STRESS

721

around the two pillars of the conventional legal analysis: (1) classifying the
condition of stress as a subjective feeling, and (2) refusing relief whenever
reasonable alternatives seem to have been available. While some
immediate legal implications were already discussed in this Part, the goal
of the next Part is to further integrate the non-legal knowledge with the
legal issue.

III. Integration: Stress-Sensitive Contractual Analysis
So far we have seen how the problem of consenting under stress is
disregarded in most courts or—in rare cases—is recognized in an undertheorized manner. We have also seen how other disciplines have studied
the human condition of stress, coming to cogent conclusions about
stressors and their impact. The goal of this Part, therefore, is to integrate
the discussions and to offer a stress-sensitive contractual analysis of the
problem of consent under stress. In general, the task calls for both a
theoretical and practical discussion. Theoretically, the study of stress
illuminates the ways the tenets of consent and fault—which are
fundamental under contract law—play out in the context of agreements
made under stress. The practical question is how willing legal actors, from
lawyers to judges, can utilize the knowledge about stress to improve the
legal response to this condition. I now turn to those two aspects of the
integration task.
A. The Study of Stress and Theories of Contract Law
The contractual discourse on stress arguments circles around two
leading ideas—quality of consent and level of fault. When a stress
argument is made, courts have to strike a balance between those ideas, as
they stand in conflict and typically reside with opposing parties: defective
consent on the side of the distressed party seeking relief versus some
fault on the side of the unstressed party who is insisting on enforcement.
More often than not, judicial concern for finding enough fault trumps the
judicial concern about flawed consent and therefore the stress argument
254
is dismissed. It is therefore imperative to re-examine both the role of
consent and the notion of fault in light of the understanding of stress. I
argue that a new balance is required because under stress a person’s
consent is “weaker” and the fault of the other party is “stronger” than
what courts have thus far considered.

254. Alan Wertheimer, Coercion 53 (1987) (arguing that the modern doctrine of duress can be
seen as being more about “wrongness and unfairness” than about “freedom and voluntariness”).
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1. Stress and the Problem of Consent
In contrast to the ideal of freedom of contract, the consent produced
under stress may no longer reflect a free choice or a true exercise of the
human will. Rather, stress typically constrains and distorts the process of
decisionmaking, producing a defective form of consent that can hardly
justify enforcement. When we recognize the toll of stress on the quality
of consent, two contrasting reactions come to mind. On the one hand, it
255
can be argued—following Judge Posner’s reasoning —that contract law
does not and should not care about the quality of consent once it has
been given. According to this line of thought, consent is understood in
absolute terms, as either perfectly present or completely missing.
Arguably, an expression of consent functions in a dichotomous world and
is either valid or invalid (if coerced by the other party). Such a view denies
the possibility that non-coercive or less-than-coercive conditions can create
an act of consent that does not amount to a meaningful consent.
On the other hand (and in opposition to Judge Posner’s reasoning),
it can be argued that contract law—being the field of law based on
256
voluntary choices and consent —must examine not only the existence of
consent, but also the actual quality of consent. Accordingly, many shades
of consent—on the spectrum between perfect consent and coerced
consent—exist. And, consequentially, some higher levels of impaired
consent should not be sufficient for the enforcement of contracts, even if
they were not fully produced by the fault of the other party.
In choosing between those two distinct approaches, it should be
noted that, as a descriptive matter, the modern law of contracts does not
confirm the first, Posnerian view. Instead, the modern law of contracts
reflects some sensitivity to the quality of consent, beyond its mere
existence. In fact, all the contractual defenses, which reflect acknowledged
reasons to avoid enforceability, can be explained by the need to recognize
257
258
the problem of defective consent. As a result, children, mentally ill
259
260
261
individuals, alcoholics, parties operating under mistake, those who

255. See supra notes 25–32 and accompanying text (discussing the Selmer case).
256. See Brian H. Bix, Contracts, in The Ethics of Consent 251, 266–67 (Franklin G. Miller &
Alan Wertheimer eds., 2010) (portraying consent as the essence of contract law and discussing consent
theories of contracts); see also Randy E. Barnett, A Consent Theory of Contract, 86 Colum. L. Rev.
269, 270 (1986) (proposing that the moral basis of a contract is founded on the consent of the parties to
exercise rights and assume duties).
257. Bix, supra note 256, at 257; see Wertheimer, supra note 254, at 233 (“Hard choices are
importantly different from other choices. They have a particularly severe constraining effect”); Peter
Birks & Chin Nyuk Yin, On the Nature of Undue Influence, in Good Faith and Fault in Contract
Law 57, 58 (Jack Beatson & Daniel Friedmann eds., 1995) (arguing that the doctrine of undue
influence is about impaired consent, not about wicked exploitation).
258. Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 14 (1981).
259. Id. § 15.
260. Id. § 16.
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are dependent on others, or those who are lacking in bargaining power
may get relief under our conventional law, despite their apparent
264
consent. What all those examples have in common is the tenet that
meaningful consent—and not simply a token of consent—is required to
have a valid contract. Moreover, although the current Restatement
avoids choosing between a focus on deterring bad behavior and on the
quality of consent, the first Restatement emphasized the importance of
265
free will and, at least in one jurisdiction, taking advantage of the other
266
party’s stress is explicitly covered by the law of duress.
At the normative level, the question becomes more challenging:
Should contract law care about cases in which the consent does not
represent a true will? In her analysis of the concept of consent, Robin
West has suggested that we are all too quick to assume that consensual
acts, such as entering into contracts, reflect a true choice made by the
267
consenting party. In reality, she argues, many consensual acts only mean
268
that outright coercion has not occurred. And, as West puts it, “[t]hat it
is consensual doesn’t tell us that it is harmless, or good, or beneficial. . . .
269
It still might have been exploitative, alienating, or grossly unfair.” In
the context of consenting to have sex, West suggests that agreeing to an
arrangement that is unfair or harmful can reside in an overlooked place

261. Id. § 153.
262. Id. § 177.
263. Id. § 208.
264. Cf. Danielle Kie Hart, Contract Formation and the Entrenchment of Power, 41 Loy. U. Chi.
L.J. 175, 218 (2009) (“[M]odern contract law, at least as presently constructed, will not be able to
remedy [problems of defective consent] effectively using its expanded policing doctrines.”).
265. Compare Restatement of Contracts § 492 (1932) (“Duress . . . means . . . any wrongful
threat of one person by words or other conduct that induces another to enter into a transaction under
the influence of such fear as precludes him from exercising free will and judgment, if the threat was
intended or should reasonably have been expected to operate as an inducement.”), with Restatement
(Second) of Contracts § 175 (“If a party’s manifestation of assent is induced by an improper threat
by the other party that leaves the victim no reasonable alternative, the contract is voidable by the
victim.”). Interestingly, the comment following the first Restatement’s definition stressed the need to
protect the vulnerable from agreeing to contracts that they are not interested in. In its relevant part it
reads:
The question is rather, did it put one entering into the transaction in such fear as to preclude
the exercise by him of free will and judgment. Age, sex, capacity, relation of the parties,
attendant circumstances, must all be considered. Persons of a weak or cowardly nature are
the very ones that need protection. The courageous can usually protect themselves; timid
persons are generally the ones influenced by threats, and the unscrupulous are not allowed
to impose upon them because they are so unfortunately constituted.
Restatement of Contracts § 492 cmt. a.
266. The courts of Illinois, for example, define duress as the imposition, oppression, undue
influence, or taking of undue advantage of the stress of another whereby one is deprived of the exercise
of his free will. See Pierce v. Atchison, Topeka & Santa Fe Ry. Co. 65 F.3d 562, 569 (7th Cir. 1995).
267. See Robin West, Sex, Law, and Consent, in The Ethics of Consent, supra note 256, at 221.
268. Id.
269. Id. at 234.
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on the spectrum—one that lies between consenting to something that is
270
good (pleasurable sex) and consenting due to coercion (rape). In this
unnoticed middle ground, we find what West calls the “unwanted
271
consent”: consenting to something one does not desire. People often
consent despite themselves, with different degrees of reluctance, for a
272
variety of reasons that make consenting better than refusing. Stress, I
argue, produces such unwanted consent. And since it is inferior to the
ideal meaningful consent, which expresses human will and freedom, it
should not be subject to the same legal presumption of validity that is
offered to fuller consent. Rather, impaired consent calls for a more
careful and contextual response, one that aspires to place any given case
somewhere on the spectrum between full consent and full coercion.
To clarify: I am not arguing that every point on the above spectrum
justifies relief. In some cases, impaired consent should be tolerated, as it
reflects the imperfect human condition and the need to allow markets to
function. In other situations, however, the given consent represents too
dangerous a sacrifice. Compare, for example, the following demonstrations
of assent: first, one’s automatic consent to a long form contract for a sale of
goods; second, one’s reluctant consent to a pay cut in a difficult economy;
and third, one’s consent to resign a job and release her employer from
273
liability after being sexually harassed. In all three cases, consent has
been expressed, but its quality has been admittedly compromised. The
cases reflect, however, different places on the spectrum. In the first
example of the form contract, we can assume some desire for the
purchased goods without true consent to the terms of getting them. In
the second example, the pay-cut agreement is further away from full
consent because both the goal of the contract and its terms are unwanted.
Finally, the “resign and release” agreement in the third example is the
most problematic because it involves a compromise in the consenting
party’s state of mind—in addition to the contract’s unwanted terms and
results. The study of stress is valuable in calling attention to such “thirddegree” cases of impaired consent. It cautions us against treating them as
similar to other cases of compromised consent: In those cases of
consenting under stress, there is an appearance of consent, but in terms
of the necessary state of mind, we are dangerously close to having no
consent at all.

270. Id. at 235.
271. Id. at 246–47.
272. In fact, many commentators have convincingly argued that for a host of reasons—from lack of
awareness, to lack of alternatives, to cognitive biases—meaningful consent is almost always absent and
therefore reflects the ideal exception rather than the norm. See, e.g., Bix, supra note 256, at 251.
273. The last scenario is based on the facts of Meyers v. Trugreen, Inc., No. 03 C 7570, 2004 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 9200, at *7–8 (N.D. Ill. May 21, 2004).
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There is a distinct risk in enforcing the products of severely impaired
consent, and it goes beyond the unfair terms of the deal. Under stressful
conditions, the contractual process itself is injurious, and the lack of an
appropriate legal process or remedy exacerbates the harm. Consenting due
to desperate conditions damages a person’s integrity and sense of self274
sovereignty. The distressed individual might internalize the message that
her anguish and true wishes do not matter in courts of law. This in turn
makes the contractual experience highly alienating, separating the pains of
personhood from the legal act of consent and—by way of enforcement—
275
allowing exploitation. In other words, without an appropriate legal
process or remedy, consenting under stress can be more than immediately
disempowering: It entails damage to the self-image of the distressed and
further deepens her powerlessness.
For example, litigation over divorce settlements illustrates the unique
damage that follows from failing to recognize the category of impaired
consent. Under the pressure of divorce, women often sign harmful divorce
settlements, and later courts often reject their request for relief.
Specifically when responding to stress arguments by divorced women,
courts deny the possibility that stress could create impaired consent.
Consider, for example, the following statement: “While [the] wife’s fear
that she may lose custody of her children no doubt caused her anxiety,
we do not recognize this as a factor impairing her ability to exercise her
276
free will and make a meaningful choice.”
Even though courts frequently admit the stressfulness of divorce,
they treat it as “normal” and “common,” and therefore as a condition
that does not negate consent. Consequently, they fail to discern the
situations in which the stress was so severe that it led to impaired rather
than sufficient consent. Penelope Bryan studied many cases of divorce
settlements and has convincingly argued that women pay the price for
277
that judicial approach. In the part of her study that focuses on the
refusal to release women from their own apparent consent, Bryan
explains that courts fail to protect women because they refuse to
recognize gender differences in the experience of stress following
divorce. In her words, courts “minimize wives’ complaints of anxiety,
depression, and mental distress, commonly noting that divorce always
278
causes stress.”
Adding the study of stress to this analysis, it is important to
remember that every scale of common stressors includes divorce and

274. West, supra note 267, at 245–47.
275. See id. at 234.
276. In re Marriage of Steadman, 670 N.E.2d 1146, 1151–52 (Ill. App. 3d 1996).
277. Penelope Eileen Bryan, Women’s Freedom to Contract at Divorce: A Mask for Contextual
Coercion, 47 Buff. L. Rev. 1153, 1270–73 (1999).
278. Id. at 1257.
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ranks it high above many other stressful life events. This means that
outside of law there is nothing “normal” about the level of stress in those
cases, which is known to be acutely high. Furthermore, despite this
common (“objective”) story, the impact of divorce on individuals is not
identical. Rather, with regard to gender, the study of stress proves that
interpersonal stressors, such as divorce, have a heightened impact on
279
women. To compound matters, women are especially susceptible to
stress-related depression that in turn further limits their coping abilities
280
and augments, in a vicious circle, their initial distress. Accordingly, it
seems reasonable to see how women are more prone than men to suffer
from the problem of impaired consent in the context of divorce
settlements. Without awareness of this potential problem impacting
consent, women’s participation in this contractual process is highly
damaging. As Bryan put it: “[D]ivorce settlements, contrary to popular
wisdom, frequently restrict rather than enhance women’s life choices by
281
leaving them impoverished and embittered.”
Enforcing contracts that are based on severely impaired consent is a
clear and immediate danger to those who are consenting under stress,
but it is also a significant hazard to the idea of contracts and to the
theoretical justification of enforcing them. A system that cannot
appropriately differentiate between fully formed and defective consent
282
may eventually lose its fundamental legitimacy. As such, consent under
stress that amounts to severely impaired consent should be regarded as a
ground for relief and a justified reason for invalidating a contract.
Nonetheless, this line of reasoning has had detractors.
Some commentators have cautioned against a liberal use of the
defenses to enforceability—such as duress and unconscionability—
arguing that extensive protection of weaker parties may deter market
players from dealing with them, ultimately limiting the ability of weaker
283
parties to function in a market society. However, this argument is not
284
convincing for two main reasons. First, this argument predicts that even
the potential award of relief would necessarily hinder the ability of the
protected individuals’ to create binding contracts. But this prediction is

279. See supra note 170 and accompanying text.
280. Sapolsky, supra note 201, at 290–91.
281. Bryan, supra note 277, at 1170.
282. Inspired by West’s argument, supra note 267, I want to compare it to the damage caused by
years of ignoring the problem of lack of consent to sex between married partners. More generally, a
system that operates on behalf of justice—but at the same time tolerates and allows clear injustice—
eventually has to change or face a loss of credibility.
283. Selmer Co. v. Blakeslee-Midwest Co., 704 F.2d 924, 928 (7th Cir. 1983) (“It is a detriment, not
a benefit, to one’s long-run interests not to be able to make a binding commitment.”). See Richard A.
Epstein, Unconscionability: A Critical Reappraisal, 18 J.L. & Econ. 293, 306–08 (1975).
284. The question raises the broader issue of paternalism, which lies beyond the scope of this
Article.
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questionable: While the prospect of protection may deter some market
players from contracting with the “protected,” in other cases it may not.
It is at least as probable that the prospect of legal relief will educate or
incentivize market players to negotiate more reasonably to avoid the
invalidation of their contract. As one commentator noted, the “potential
husband might be interested in marrying even if the terms of his
285
proposed premarital agreement must be made more fair.”
Second, this argument assumes a simplistic model of the market,
where the weaker market players can easily be identified and avoided.
However, while some market players may develop a preference not to deal
with an identified group of people to escape judicial scrutiny of
286
transactions, it is much harder, or even impossible, to systematically
avoid parties under stress. This conclusion arises from the fact that stress,
as a form of vulnerability, is a universal and inevitable human condition
that transcends group identities and instead necessitates contextual and
287
concrete analysis, rather than a group-based protection. Everyone is
vulnerable and can become distressed, because we are all susceptible to an
288
“ever-present possibility of harm, injury, and misfortune.” Thus, stress
289
presents a “post-identity paradigm” that alleviates the risk of rejection of
particular disadvantaged groups from the contractual sphere. Employers,
for example, cannot avoid contracting with their resigning employees, even
if courts will be more aware of the stressfulness of a job loss and will
heighten their scrutiny over the terms of separation agreements. Since the
proposed judicial protection on the basis of stress is carefully calibrated to
context, it can create an incentive against exploitation without risking the
ability of any particular group to create binding contracts.
2. Stress and the Problem of Fault
Even those who are convinced that the quality of consent—whether
“perfect” or impaired—should stand at the center of any discussion
involving stress and contracts may still wonder about its relationship to
the concept of fault. Can impaired consent itself be sufficient ground for
relief or should the impairment result necessarily from faulty acts of the
other party?
285. Bix, supra note 256, at 260.
286. I have argued elsewhere that such preference is discriminatory and that contract law, in
addition to other laws, should ban it. See Hila Keren, “We Insist! Freedom Now”: Does Contract
Doctrine Have Anything Constitutional to Say? 11 Mich. J. Race & L. 133, 172 (2005) (explaining why
and how contract law has an essential role to play in the context of discrimination even when antidiscrimination laws are available and may apply).
287. In making this argument I am drawing on Martha Fineman’s compelling vulnerability theory.
See generally Martha Albertson Fineman, The Vulnerable Subject: Anchoring Equality in the Human
Condition, 20 Yale J. L. & Feminism 1 (2008).
288. Id. at 9.
289. Id. at 17.
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We have already seen that requiring fault as a condition to relief is
290
sometimes explained by the need to discourage wrongful behavior. The
main problem with such a fault-based justification is that it conforms to
the policies supporting tort law, rather than to the logic of contract. As
many legal scholars have posited: Modern contract law is mainly fault291
free, while tort law is the field of law saturated with fault. Remarkably,
although the fault-based justification is attributed to Judge Posner, it
stands in stark conflict with Posner’s general writings on the topic of fault
in contract law. In a symposium dedicated to the “fault line” that divides
292
tort law from contract law, Judge Posner stressed: “My thesis is that
concepts of fault or blame, at least when understood in moral terms
rather than translated into economic or other practical terms, are not
293
useful addenda to the doctrines of contract law.”
It can, of course, be argued that fault should be required in both fields
of law. Following such argument to its logical conclusion, it is possible that
a given behavior would justify awarding relief under contract law and, at
the same time, constitute a tort. And indeed, current tort law addresses
stress, even recognizing it as a tort when one is evidently causing the stress
294
of another. However, even if fault may appear in both fields of law, it
does not mean that it should appear in both of them. In this context, note
that placing a tort-like goal in contracts has more than theoretical
consequences. Because a fault-based system must ensure that the action
discouraged is improper enough to justify legal intervention, the bar for
fault is raised. While a high bar might be appropriate under a tort regime
where fault is often followed by heavy damages, it may be more
problematic to adopt contractual high standard of fault when the risk is
limited to the invalidation of the contract. The end result of elevating the
fault bar is dangerous: Courts may approve and legitimize the vice of
taking advantage of another’s vulnerability. They may find, as one court
bluntly put it, that the “assertion of duress requires more than that a

290. Selmer Co. v. Blakeslee-Midwest Co., 704 F.2d 924, 928 (7th Cir. 1983).
291. See generally Roy Kreitner, Fault at the Contract-Tort Interface, 107 Mich. L. Rev. 1533, 1539–
41 (2009) (describing the shift in the modernization of contract law from a fault-based regime to a nofault, privatized regime).
292. Symposium, Fault in American Contract Law, 107 Mich. L. Rev. 1341 (2009).
293. Richard A. Posner, Let Us Never Blame a Contract Breaker, 107 Mich. L. Rev. 1349, 1349
(2009) (emphasis added). Posner attributed his thesis to Holmes. Id. (“I have borrowed this thesis
from Holmes, who . . . drew a sharp distinction between tort and contract law, so far as issues of fault
or blameworthiness are concerned.”).
294. See Restatement (Second) of Torts § 46 (1965). Remarkably, the comments to the
Restatement of Torts suggest that the legal understanding of what is referred to as “emotional
distress” is far from being fully developed. Id. cmt. c. So much so that a caveat was added stating, “The
Institute expresses no opinion as to whether there may not be other circumstances under which the
actor may be subject to liability for the intentional or reckless infliction of emotional distress.” Id.
(caveat). Following the above caveat, comment c states, “The law is still in a stage of development, and
the ultimate limits of this tort are not yet determined.” Id. cmt. c.
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party took advantage of another’s negative economic situation.” For all
those reasons combined, subjecting the contractual relief to a high
296
standard of fault seems questionable.
I would argue further that any consideration of fault should stem
from the contractual structure of the dilemma: the need to balance the
interests of the party seeking relief and the party who stands to lose a
desirable contract if relief is awarded. Conditioning the relief to the
distressed party on the presence of some fault of the unstressed party can
thus be seen as merely balancing their opposing interests. This balancing
does not call for a high level of fault. The goal of assessing the behavior
of the party seeking enforcement is not to deter, educate, or punish that
party, but rather to satisfy fairness concerns—that is, to make sure that
awarding relief would not cause injustice. Thus, even modestly flawed
behavior should suffice to award relief to a severely distressed party.
Because a balancing justification is more plausible, the integration
challenge is to demonstrate how the study of stress can help in
reconceptualizing the kind of fault that might justify relief. First, we are
now more able to recognize that stress is almost never caused by one
factor or one person; instead, we usually witness clusters of stressors and
a resulting distress that has several different causes. Therefore, it is futile
to require, as many courts do, that the party seeking enforcement be the
main cause of the vulnerability of the party seeking relief. In reality,
posing such a high bar of fault simply works to defeat the distressed
party, even when some fault of the other party is evident. Such was
clearly the situation in Gascho. Since Mary Ann was not only under the
stress of losing her job, but was also going through a painful and violent
divorce, her employer, the party seeking enforcement, could not have
been, by definition, the main cause of her stress.
Second, and more significantly, the study of stress teaches us that
stress—especially as it so often works in conjunction with depression and
insomnia—is highly visible and frequently has many physical
manifestations such as crying episodes, irritability, extreme weight
changes, dependence on medical treatments, and daily use of medications.
All those clear signs of vulnerability strongly suggest that at least some
level of fault is almost always present in cases of consenting under stress.
Such a basic level of fault originates from the awareness of one party that

295. Storie v. Household Int’l, Inc., No. 03-40268, 2005 WL 3728718, at *5 (D. Mass. Sept. 22,
2005) (emphasis added).
296. This is not to suggest that there are no “pockets of fault” in contract law. For a description of
some, see the articles mentioned in Omri Ben-Shahar & Ariel Porat, Fault in American Contract Law,
107 Mich. L. Rev. 1341, 1342 (2009) (describing contributions by Melvin Eisenberg, Richard Epstein,
and George Cohen). However, the authors summarize the entire symposium, stating that “even after
highlighting the many faces of fault in contract law, it is all the more clear that the role of fault is
limited.” Id. at 1344.
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the other is operating under significant stress, and that awareness is
followed by a decision to ignore the palpable signs of distress and move
the deal to completion.
The idea can be illustrated by revisiting Gascho. The hospital did not
cause Mary Ann’s divorce, but it strongly encouraged her to sign a release
agreement, while understanding the precariousness of her condition and
297
denying her time to recover. In fact, the representatives of the hospital
who personally negotiated with Mary Ann admitted knowing everything
about her difficult situation—the bruises on her body, her major loss of
weight, her severe depression, her insomnia, her medications, and her
298
constant weeping during the closure of the agreement. The hospital’s
awareness, combined with its determination to proceed with the
contractual process, should have together represented a clear willingness
to take advantage of Mary Ann’s vulnerability.
In most cases, however, the party seeking to enforce the contract is
at a higher level of fault and is more involved in exacerbating the stress—
even if it cannot be blamed for initially causing it. Parties showing this
type of opportunistic behavior are not only aware of the stress of the
other but are actively adding to it by pressuring their distressed
counterparty. They sometimes do so by creating time pressure, rushing
the other party to give consent or suffer the consequences. This is a
recurrent story, for example, in the context of prenuptial agreements,
when brides-to-be are put in the dilemma of accepting an unfair prenuptial
agreement or facing a last-minute cancellation of their wedding. Similar
time pressures are imposed in the lending process, where distraught
borrowers are told by potential lenders that they have only a limited time
299
to agree to a refinancing agreement before foreclosure will be initiated.
Stress studies, as we have seen, demonstrate that time pressure has the
300
ability to aggravate significantly any given set of stressors. Beyond
creating time pressure, other examples of fault—in the form of
worsening the initial stress and enhancing the vulnerability—include
creating an intimidating setting before or during the closure of the deal,
overstating the harsh consequences of not signing the contract, and
threatening legal actions. In one case, for example, a lender was aware of
the borrower’s desperate condition, which included the recent death of her
297. Gascho v. Scheurer Hosp., No. 08-10955-BC, 2009 WL 2222872, at *2 (E.D. Mich. July 23, 2009).
298. Id.
299. For a vivid description of the impact of time pressure in this lending context, see In re Davis,
169 B.R. 285, 290, 297 (Bankr. E.D.N.Y. 1994) (“Everything was done so fast, sign this, sign this. The
title man was there. He had a six o’clock appointment it was his son’s birthday and he was rushing and
I was questioning this thing because I really didn’t want to do it. They kept on pushing me and pushing
me and saying this and that.”).
300. Many stress-sensitive courts intuitively respond to the impact of time pressure. See, e.g.,
Holler v. Holler, 612 S.E.2d 469, 475–76 (S.C. Ct. App. 2005). (“Husband made it perfectly clear to
Wife that she must sign the agreement if she wanted to be married prior to the expiration of her visa.”).
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husband followed by a diagnosis of “severe depression and diabetes.”
The lender then added pressure in order to obtain the borrower’s consent
to a refinancing agreement she could not afford, warning her that she has
302
to act or the lender “will have to take other action.”
To a large extent, fault is tied to stress because of its fundamentally
seductive quality. Being so evident and extreme, stress seems to entice
exploitation because it presents an easy opportunity to make extra
profit—profit not possible under normal conditions. Sadly, for too many
players in the market, this temptation is hard to resist. Problematically,
courts that fail to define the act of taking advantage as sufficient fault not
only allow such behavior but also reward it.
To conclude, the kind of fault that should be required as a condition
for relief should be changed to include all the cases in which the party
seeking enforcement knew or should have known about the stress. Due
to the characteristic visibility of stress and its outcomes, a state of true
innocence is, at best, rare. Indeed, in the many cases discussed in this
Article, no party argued that they failed to notice the stress of the party
303
seeking relief. Therefore, each time the party seeking relief is able to
prove its distress at the time of consent, relief should not be denied based
on no-fault arguments unless the party seeking enforcement can show
innocence—that is, that there were no signs of severe stress and that it
304
did not and should have not known about the other’s vulnerability. No
party to a contract has a valid expectation for social support—by way of
judicial enforcement—when it was involved in exploiting distress, such as
when a party obtains consent from someone who is shaking and crying.
The proposed broadening of the concept of fault from causing stress to
being aware of it can be supported by the need to protect individuals, and
305
the market as a whole, from exploitative behavior. Finally, what I suggest
301. Beneficial Mortg. Co. of Ohio v. Leach, No. 01AP-737, 2002 WL 926759, at *6 (Ohio Ct. App.
May 9, 2002).
302. Id. Although the court did not find such exploitative behavior as satisfying the requirements
of the duress doctrine, it did find the facts justified a hearing with regard to possible unconscionability.
There is a conceptual damage, however, in thinking and declaring that there is not enough wrong in
taking advantage of others. Also, in many other cases the analysis of “not-enough-fault” leads to total
rejection of the stress argument. See, e.g., Storie v. Household Int’l, Inc., No. 03-40268, 2005 WL
3728718, at*9 (D. Mass. Sept. 22, 2005).
303. However, the possibility exists, as one can imagine, that some individuals might conceal their
stress during the negotiation to avoid exploitation of their vulnerability.
304. Compare this to the defense of unilateral mistake, Restatement (Second) of Contracts
§ 153 cmt. a (1981) (“[R]elief has been granted where the other party actually knew or had reason to
know of the mistake at the time the contract was made or where his fault caused the mistake.”
(citation omitted)).
305. See, e.g., Rich & Whillock, Inc. v. Ashton Dev., Inc., 204 Cal. Rptr. 86, 90 (Cal. App. 1984)
(“Those rules are not limited to precepts of rationality and self-interest. They include equitable
notions of fairness and propriety which preclude the wrongful exploitation of business exigencies to
obtain disproportionate exchanges of value. Such exchanges make a mockery of freedom of contract
and undermine the proper functioning of our economic system.” (emphasis added)); Spencer Nathan
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can also be explained in terms of risk allocation: Taking advantage of
perceptible stress in order to win a contractual windfall can be seen as
taking a calculated risk that the distressed party may later on, typically
after some recovery, seek relief. It is, therefore, within the judicial role,
and in fact a judicial duty, to do justice in those situations by appropriately
balancing the parties’ interests.
3. Stress and the Objective/Subjective Dichotomy
As we have seen, the fault requirement is not the only obstacle to
those who seek a remedy for consenting under stress. They are often
judged for surrendering to “subjective” feelings rather than utilizing
“objectively” available alternatives. A prime example appears in Satter,
in which the court stated:
When Satter states that she suffered anxiety, depression, and an
inability to sleep or be alone, she is speaking about things she
subjectively felt and experienced. . . . [T]he Court’s duty is to decide
whether a reasonable person in Satter’s position . . . would have felt
forced to resign. Such an objective standard does not take into account
the things Satter was subjectively feeling or experiencing
306
emotionally . . . .

Despite those clear words, the objective/subjective dichotomy is
highly inappropriate if one understands how stress operates. Integrating
that knowledge into legal analysis produces several important conclusions.
First, stress is not dominantly subjective but rather a common and
patterned factual phenomenon, as suggested by the host of inventories of
common stressors and recognized outcomes of stress. Even if stressors
impact individuals differently, it is not mainly due to their unique
emotional fabric, but is usually a result of other objective factors, such as
other existing stressors, their social status, and/or the resources available
to them. Furthermore, since stress is visible, measurable, and provable, it
can be described as objective rather than subjective. Many distressed
parties show evident physical signs of severe stress—such as crying and
307
shaking while giving their consent —and/or present clear professional

Thal, The Inequality of Bargaining Power Doctrine: The Problem of Defining Contractual Unfairness,
8 Oxford J. Legal Stud. 17, 22 (1988) (“[F]reedom of contract doctrine should not be accepted as a
validating principle for contracts which arise as a result of exploitation. . . . [T]he most significant
problem . . . is . . . formulating a coherent definition of exploitation. Such a definition is essential in
order to maintain the limited nature of the claim.”).
306. Satter v. Wash. State Dep’t of Ecology, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 80520, at *6 (W.D. Wash. Aug.
10, 2010). For a case using similar juxtaposition, see Middleton v. Dep’t of Def., 185 F.3d 1374, 1379
(Fed. Cir. 1999) (“This test is an objective, rather than subjective one; an employee’s subjective feelings
are irrelevant.” (emphasis added)); Christie v. United States, 518 F.2d 584, 587 (Ct. Cl. 1975) (“Duress
is not measured by the employee’s subjective evaluation of a situation. Rather, the test is an objective
one.” (emphasis added)).
307. McDevitt v. Guenther, 522 F. Supp. 2d 1272, 1278 (D. Haw. 2007) (a bride-to-be signing a
harsh prenuptial agreement, in front of a notary, while crying, shaking and vomiting).
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evidence of their distressed condition. Their stress exists objectively
and should be evaluated accordingly.
Second, similar to the way in which stress is not merely subjective,
the reasonable alternative test is not purely an objective test. The
alternatives imagined in retrospect by judges are often not available to a
distressed party who is under pressure to give consent or suffer severe
consequences. It is doubtful, for example, whether a bride-to-be, just a few
days before her wedding, can see (or should see) the alternative of
cancelling her wedding at the last minute as a viable alternative. Although
such an alternative may seem reasonable to a judge who looks at the
situation years after the signing of the prenuptial agreement, such a view is
309
not more objective than the bride’s perspective at the time of signing.
More generally, judges often point to possible forms of action that are
heavily influenced by their own (subjective) combinations of capabilities,
resources, resilience, and calm. Consequently, they frequently end up
recommending litigation as a reasonable alternative, without taking into
account the demanding and intimidating nature of the process—especially
for lay people overwhelmed by stress. Additionally, and more critically, as
310
the alternatives study has shown, the scanning of alternatives by persons
under stress is different than the scanning of alternatives by unstressed
people—a fact that needs to be taken into account.
If stress is not a subjective feeling and the alternatives are not so
objective, it is essential to eliminate such rhetoric as—due to lingering
legal aversion to subjectivity and resistance to arguments based on
311
emotions —it leaves little chance for appropriate treatment of the
problem. The “reasonable alternative” test should therefore be refined
to better reflect the science of stress, which shows that distressed parties
have limited reasonable alternatives.
B. Framework for Taking Stress into Account
As I have argued thus far, taking stress into account is not only
highly important, it is also attainable. Critically and perhaps surprisingly,
it would require little change of doctrine. Once the veil of “subjective
feeling” is removed and the focus is shifted from the fault of the party

308. Gascho v. Scheurer Hosp., 400 F. App’x 978, 980 (6th Cir. 2010) (introducing a detailed
psychiatric report confirming major depression from the day that followed the signing of the contract).
309. See, e.g., In re Marriage of Spiegel, 553 N.W.2d 309, 318 (Iowa 1996) (“Here, Sara had a
reasonable alternative—she could have canceled the wedding. Although she may have suffered
embarrassment in doing so, we do not think social embarrassment from the cancellation of wedding
plans, even on the eve of the wedding, renders that choice unreasonable.”).
310. Keinan, supra note 235, at 643. For a discussion of Keinan’s work in the context of the recent
subprime crisis, see Lauren E. Willis, Decisionmaking and the Limits of Disclosure: The Problem of
Predatory Lending: Price, 65 Md. L. Rev. 707, 769–71 (2006).
311. See, e.g., Abrams & Keren, supra note 88, at 1998.
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seeking enforcement to the quality of consent of the party seeking relief,
the challenge is almost fully met. Courts and practitioners can use the
knowledge accumulated in years of research to evaluate stress arguments
and in appropriate cases—when stress has led to an unfair contract—to
312
prevent the exploitation of distressed parties. One stress-sensitive
starting point may come from Europe, where the principles of contract law
include an explicit ban on exploiting or profiting from the vulnerability of
313
others. Next, I suggest that a stress-sensitive approach will build on the
intuitive reasoning of stress-sensitive case law and augment that reasoning
with considerations informed by the study of stress. Within this suggested
stress-sensitive framework, four elements deserve special attention: the
existence of scientifically acknowledged common stressors, the presence
of factors creating special vulnerability, the manifestation of recognized
symptoms, and the question of alternatives to contractual consent for a
distressed person.
1. Common Stressors
A stress argument relies on a stressor that allegedly had caused the
stress. The inventories described in Part II allow an evaluation of the
alleged stressor: The more recognizable and severe the stressor is
considered by stress specialists, the more credibility should be given to the
stress argument. This Article highlights three contractual contexts in which
the agreements are made in an environment that is loaded with common
and acknowledged stressors. First, in the employment setting, employees
consenting to resign and release their employers from liability are often
314
doing so under special stressful circumstances. However, even without
additional misfortunes, the instability at the workplace and the
anticipation of a job loss are recognized significant stressors. Second,
contracts between borrowers and lenders are frequently made under

312. To prevent such exploitation, any of the existing doctrines of unconscionability, undue influence
and/or duress may be used, and/or an expanded duty to negotiate in good faith can be adopted.
Comparing the doctrines and choosing between them goes beyond the purpose and scope of this Article,
given its focus on the problem of stress. However, others have discussed the similarities and differences
between those doctrines. See, e.g., John Phillips, Protecting Those in a Disadvantageous Negotiating
Position: Unconscionable Bargains as a Unifying Doctrine, 45 Wake Forest L. Rev. 837 (2010).
313. Melvin Aron Eisenberg, The Role of Fault in Contract Law: Unconscionability, Unexpected
Circumstances, Interpretation, Mistake, and Nonperformance, 107 Mich. L. Rev. 1413, 1418 (2009) (citing
the Principles of European Contract Law, which provide: “A party may avoid a contract if, at the time of
the conclusion of the contract: (a) it was . . . in economic distress or had urgent needs, was improvident,
ignorant, inexperienced or lacking in bargaining skill, and (b) the other party knew or ought to have
known of this and, given the circumstances and purpose of the contract, took advantage of the first party’s
situation in a way which was grossly unfair or took an excessive benefit.” (emphasis added)).
314. Recall, for example, the sexual harassment suffered by Ms. Meyers, Meyers v. Trugreen, Inc.,
No. 03 C 7570, 2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 9200 (N.D. Ill. May 21, 2004), and the hostile environment that
had developed in the hospital that employed Ms. Gascho, Gascho v. Scheurer Hosp., 400 F. App’x 978,
979–80 (6th Cir. 2010).
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conditions related to the accepted stressor of financial strains. And third,
in the intimate sphere, settlements between life-partners—either before
the marriage or as part of a divorce process—are also made in connection
with life-changing events that rank high on inventories of stressors. Other
stress arguments can be concretely judged by a relatively simple review
of the stress literature, which can assist in distinguishing situations that
are acknowledged for their likelihood to produce stress from those which
are less familiar or plausible.
2. Special Vulnerability Issues
In constructing or evaluating a stress argument, special attention
should be given not only to commonalities between people, but also to
factors that make them differ in their response to stressful events. Thus,
individual and social factors that tend to enhance or decrease the level of
stress should be taken into account. Starting from the individual level,
courts should evaluate any argument contextually to assess the significance
of the leading stressor for the person before them. Additionally, the
primary stressor in each case should not be reviewed in isolation; rather,
clustering of stressors and the tendency of stressors to proliferate should
be considered, and other existing stressors should be defined as well.
315
Holler, for example, demonstrates the way that a fear of a last-minute
wedding cancellation combines with the challenges of pregnancy,
unemployment, and an immigrant visa that is about to expire. Still at the
individual level, the material and mental resources available for coping
with “universal,” or objective, stressors should play an essential role in
the evaluation of the magnitude of the stress. As we have seen, abundant
resources make it easier to cope while exhausted reserves may escalate
the initial problem.
Beyond the individual level, appreciation of what theorists have
called “the social distribution of stress” necessitates sensitivity to the role
of race, gender, and social status. For example, the fact that women are
influenced more than men by interpersonal stressors should add credibility
to a stress argument made by women who have given consent in the course
of a difficult divorce process. To take another example, research has
demonstrated that every step down the ladder of socioeconomic status
316
produces more stress, as less control allows less room for coping.
Integrating this piece of information into the analysis can justify, for
317
example, the intuitive result of the stress-sensitive Meyers decision.
Meyers’ stress argument gains power if we bear in mind her low status as
a young sales associate who was sexually harassed by a series of senior

315. Holler v. Holler, 612 S.E.2d 469, 475–76 (S.C. Ct. App. 2005).
316. See supra notes 195–196 and accompanying text.
317. Meyers, 2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 9200 at *17.
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male managers. Moreover, in addition to special factors affecting
individuals and social differences, some concrete circumstances should be
considered relevant. For example, time pressure has been consistently
shown to aggravate stress, a fact that has been intuitively recognized by
318
some stress-sensitive courts.
3. Recognizable Symptoms
As we have seen, stressors trigger a secretion of special hormones in
the brain, and those eventually create recognizable symptoms of stress
such as insomnia, depression, and change in body weight. These symptoms
can assist in evaluating the credibility of a given stress argument and can
alleviate the fear of manipulation that comes from conceptualizing stress
as merely a feeling. Importantly, recognizing the chemical cortisol
connection between stress, insomnia, and depression makes it crucial
that legal actors, from lawyers to judges, take greater cognizance of
medical evidence. A psychiatric report that proves major depression and
is not disputed by the other party, for example, cannot remain irrelevant
to courts that care about quality of consent; the same goes for evidence
319
regarding use of prescribed medications to relieve stress symptoms.
4. Reasonable Alternatives
Any consideration of reasonable alternatives must reflect the way
that stress limits the ability to perceive alternatives and impairs the
competence to choose reasonably among those perceived as available. A
stress-sensitive analysis would take these insights into account and re-focus
the question of alternatives. If the stress argument is plausible, under the
first three elements, the question should be whether it was reasonable for
a person under such stress to consent to an undesirable contract. The
burden of showing that another alternative was visible and viable for the
person under stress should accordingly shift to the party seeking to
enforce the contract.

Conclusion
These four elements suggest a framework for an informed
evaluation of stress arguments that brings non-legal knowledge to an
important and familiar legal question—the question of consenting under
stress. Unfortunately, with the current deep recession and its
318. Id. at *15 (stating that the situation became more acute because Meyers had only three days
to deliberate).
319. For an example of courts’ disregard of medical evidence, see Gascho, 400 F. App’x at 980;
Satter v. Wash. State Dep’t of Ecology, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 80520 (W.D. Wash. Aug. 10, 2010); see
also Coleman v. Coleman, 681 P.2d 1269, 1270 (Utah 1984) (rejecting a stress argument despite a
physician’s testimony that described the distressed party as “very depressed,” incapable of making
important decisions, and using prescribed tranquilizers and antidepressants).
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consequences, the question is especially relevant and requires immediate
attention. So far, most legal actors have fallen short in fully coping with
this issue. However, as I have argued here, law cannot afford to remain
coldly doctrinal and isolated from other bodies of knowledge. An
isolated, insensitive legal response to stress could become another major
stressor in people’s lives, exacerbating rather than mitigating problems of
exploitation.
I am not the first to suggest that exploiting others’ vulnerability is or
320
should be unacceptable under contract law. However, this Article is
now contributing a studied explanation of why it is not only justified but
also important, and quite urgent, to do so. To the legal arena it offers the
first account of how stress can impair consent, even where that stress is
not caused by the other party. It also provides a counterargument to
Posner’s fault approach, which permits the exploitation of vulnerability
as an acceptable contractual practice. With the study of stress gradually
illuminating the scope of the problem and its dire consequences to
individuals, communities, and society at large, law cannot afford to
remain behind. In the face of stressful life circumstances, the law can
offer relief by outlawing the exploitation of stress and vulnerability. It is
incumbent on legal actors to take this path.
In the field of contract law, the long interdisciplinary journey
charted here leads to a relatively simple, practical conclusion. A more
responsive contract law must attend more carefully to the quality of
consent as a condition for contractual validity. Deploying the four basic
elements outlined above, existing fairness-oriented doctrines—such as
duress or unconscionability—can be used to protect those whose consent
was impaired by stress. In fact, some stress-sensitive courts are already
showing protective inclinations, and this Article offers a research-based
justification for their decisions.
Theoretically, however, the insight reflected in this Article extends
far beyond the contractual arena. Consent given under stress presents a
legal problem in a host of legal fields, both substantial and procedural.
People may consent under stress to have sex (criminal law), to have
children (family law), to go through medical procedures (health law), to
use arbitration or mediation (civil procedure), to sign a plea bargain
(criminal procedure), and so forth. In all those matters, and others, the law
can benefit by understanding the operation and effects of stress and by
accounting for it in the analysis of consent. This Article offers a path
toward that goal.
320. See, e.g., John P. Dawson, Economic Duress—An Essay in Perspective, 45 Mich. L. Rev. 253,
288–90 (1947) (famously arguing that the duress doctrine was based on the principle of prevention of
excessive gain resulting from exploitation of impaired bargaining power); see also Alan Wertheimer,
Exploitation 37–76 (1996) (arguing that cases in which relief was given under the doctrine of
unconscionability often can be explained by the existence of exploitation).
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